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INTRODUCTION
In London, police say that every worker or shopper is caught
on at least 300 cameras every day.1 [In the United States] the
security industry estimates that more than 2 million surveil-
lance cameras are in use across the country. In Manhattan in
1998, volunteers counted 2,400 electronic eyes in public places
used to catch everything from red-light runners at traffic inter-
sections, shoplifters outside grocery and department stores,
and drug sellers loitering near lampposts.2
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were
being watched at any given moment. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984.3
[If . . . dragnet type law enforcement practices should eventu-
ally occur, there will be time enough then to determine
1 Alfred Lee, Big Brother is Watching You, THE STRArrS TIMES (Singapore),
August 23, 2001, at 7.
2 Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Forms Network of Surveillance, WASH. PosT, Feb. 17,
2002, at Cl.
3 at 3 (Harold Bloom ed., Chelsea House 1987)(1949).
[VOL. 72214
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. whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.
United States v. Knotts.'
It is time to constitutionalize strictures on public surveil-
lance. The advent of sophisticated technology that allows the
government to watch, zoom in on, track, and record the activi-
ties of anyone, anywhere in public, twenty-four hours a day,
demands regulation. Yet to date no meaningful constraints on
this type of surveillance exist. The constant drumbeat of the
"war on crime," louder than ever since the terrorist attack on
September 11, has drowned out calls for greater control over
technological surveillance of the streets. This article argues
that the Fourth Amendment requires courts to regulate such
surveillance-in particular camera surveillance of public activi-
ty-if the legislative and executive branches are unwilling to do
so on their own.
The primary obstacle to this agenda is the United States
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Knotts,5 which
considered the Fourth Amendment's application to tracking a
car's movements with an electronic beeper. There the Court
held that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thor-
oughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments from one place to another.' Even more significantly, it
concluded that the fact that such movements might be detected
through use of a beeper rather than via visual surveillance
"does not alter the situation."7 If the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated by technological surveillance of a car traveling on
public thoroughfares, it is unlikely to apply to enhanced sur-
veillance of a person walking the streets.
As the portion of Knotts highlighted above indicates, how-
ever, the Court did broach a caveat to its conclusion-perhaps a
tiny one, but nonetheless one that is very pertinent today.
Knotts had argued that a holding that no search occurs when
police track a person's car using a beeper would mean that
460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
' 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
6 Knotts, at 281.
' Id. at 282.
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HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 215 2002-2003
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
"twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country
will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision."'
Although the Court considered this observation irrelevant to
the case at hand, where the beeper had merely been used to
relocate the receptacle in which it had been placed after police
lost visual contact,9 it also acknowledged that the type of
"dragnet" practices conjectured by Knotts might raise constitu-
tional issues."i
That concession is important because in many urban, and
even some suburban, areas today, full-time technological sur-
veillance of the public is the norm.1 While tracking devices
comprise one aspect of this surveillance, it is cameras, posi-
tioned on buildings and telephone poles, that pose the biggest
threat in this regard. The traditionally grainy video image,
accessible at the time it is captured only by the camera opera-
tor, is rapidly being replaced by digital technology that produc-
es top-quality images available in real time to police and to
others at remote locations, including command centers and
patrol cars.' 2 Digitization allows much easier long-term stor-
age than bulky videotape, thereby increasing the potential that
images will be around longer and viewed by more people, and it
also makes possible identification of those captured on camera
through computer-based matching programs (called "biometric"
technology). 3 Dragnet surveillance is upon us.
Id. at 283.
The government had installed the beeper in a chloroform container, which
an accomplice of Knotts purchased. Id. at 278. The accomplice placed the contain-
er in his car, which police followed. Id. The container was soon transferred to the
car of another accomplice, which police also followed. But the driver used evasive
maneuvers, and the police had to resort to the beeper signal to discover the
whereabouts of the container, which was located in a cabin in which Knotts and
others had constructed a drug laboratory. Id. at 278-79.
10 Id. at 284.
n See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 20-28. Even poor quality video can be
enhanced with new technology. Elizabeth Mehren, Technology Helps Put Surveil-
lance in Focus, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at 24 (describing a company called "Sa-
lient Stills" that can create a more cohesive image out of blurry video by making
a composite out of several frames).
" See Christopher S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveil-
lance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 295, 3030-08 (1999)(describing digital
and biometric technology).
[VOL. 72
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The Court's unwillingness in Knotts to announce definitive-
ly that all public surveillance is unregulated by the Constitu-
tion may reflect an intuition that at some point this type of
surveillance amounts to a serious infringement of "reasonable
expectations of privacy," the concept that defines the scope of
the Fourth Amendment. 4 Yet the Court's hesitancy to push
that idea any further in Knotts probably stems not only from
traditional judicial parsimony, but also from its perplexity over
how one can possess "privacy" in public. When one's every
movement is readily observable by others, how can one expect
constitutional protection of those movements?
This article answers that question from a number of per-
spectives, summed up in the notion that we all possess a "right
to anonymity," even when in public. Continuous, repeated or
recorded government surveillance of our innocent public activi-
ties that are not meant for public consumption is neither ex-
pected nor to be condoned, for it ignores the fundamental fact
that we express private thoughts through conduct as well as
through words. The Fourth Amendment should be construed to
recognize the right to public anonymity as a part of the privacy
expectations that, to use the Supreme Court's well-known
phrase, "society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."15
Part I of this article sets the stage for this argument by
describing some of the surveillance technology that exists and
the deficiencies in the way legislatures and courts have reacted
to it. Part II develops the basis for the right to public anonymi-
ty. It draws from a number of different commentators and
court decisions, as well as from an empirical study that demon-
strates the extent to which ordinary citizens value the ability
to walk and drive the streets without having to contend with
constant technological monitoring. Part III then explicates the
implications of the right to anonymity, relying to a significant
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967XHarlan, J., concurring). See
infra text accompanying notes 235-247.
15 This language first appeared in Harlan's concurrence in Katz. See Katz, 389
U.S. at 361. It has since found its way into several majority opinions. See, e.g.,
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 29-40 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 211 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984).
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extent on the recommendations of the American Bar
Association's Standards on Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance, 6 for which I was the Reporter.
As Part III makes clear, a determination that public sur-
veillance must be subject to constitutional review does not
necessarily mean that the usual Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence-involving warrants, probable cause, and so on-applies
to this particular type of government activity. I argue that the
courts' role should consist of setting minimal guidelines and
monitoring police decisions to assure that such surveillance is
conducted in a reasonable manner. More specifically, I contend
that, given its relatively unintrusive nature, most public sur-
veillance of individuals does not require probable cause in the
traditional sense. At the same time, rules regarding who is
involved in the targeting decision, the execution of the police
action, and post-action record-keeping and disclosure should
assume much more significance here than in connection with
the classic police search. While most of the details would be left
up to the political process, application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to public surveillance would guarantee that, in contrast
to the current state of affairs, courts would have the opportuni-
ty to provide legislative bodies with a "constitutional road map"
on an issue that is already a potent symbol of government-
citizen interaction, and one that is likely to become more so in
years to come. 7
A sub-theme of this article is that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence needs to expand its focus beyond the traditional
individualized suspicion model, backed by a motion for exclu-
sion, as the primary means of protecting individual interests.
Surveillance of large numbers of people cannot, and should not,
16 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRM1HNAL JUSTICE-ELECTRoNIc
SURVEILLANCE (3D ED.), SECTION B: TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SUR-
VEILLANCE [hereafter ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA Standards were drafted by a
Task Force composed of judges, lawyers, law enforcement officials and privacy
experts in a series of meetings from 1995 through 1997, and were subject to
comment and redrafting by both the Standards Committee and the Council of the
Criminal Justice Section of the ABA, before being approved by the ABA's House
of Delegates in August, 1998.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 311-15.
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be justified on a person-by-person basis. Nor is the suppression
remedy likely to be an effective deterrent in this context, since
at best it benefits an infinitesimally small number of people
subjected to the illegal surveillance, and in any event is a poor
remedial fit with the types of violations that public surveillance
involves. The dissonance between public surveillance and the
individualized suspicion/exclusionary rule model suggests a
need for rethinking both the type of justification and the man-
ner of implementation the Fourth Amendment requires. Part
IV makes some brief observations in this regard, based on some
of my previous work.
I. CAMERA SURVEILLANCE OF THE PUBLIC Now AND
IN THE NEAR-FUTURE
The government uses cameras to watch us in all sorts of
venues, ranging from private stores to public restrooms, from
government-owned buildings to public streets, from traffic in-
tersections and parking lots to detentions of motorists by state
troopers. 8 This article will focus on government camera sur-
veillance of pedestrians in the public streets, as distinguished
from video monitoring of building interiors and motorist stops.
Thus, this article's use of the phrase "public camera surveil-
lance" and its commonly accepted abbreviation "CCTV"-for
closed circuit television-will refer only to the former type of
surveillance. Even when defined in this narrow sense, public
surveillance using camera technology is likely to increase expo-
nentially in the next decade. As in other areas of technological
development, the law is not likely to keep up. 9
A. The Surveillance Dragnet
The future has arrived in Washington, D.C., in the wake of
the terrorist attacks of September 11. Hundreds of government
cameras are trained on streets, subways, school hallways, and
' See infra text accompanying notes 29-34.
" See Joyce W. Luk, Identifying Terrorists: Private Rights in the United States
and United Kingdom, 25 HASTINGS INTL & CoMP. L. Rsv. 223, 256-57
(2002)(describing reactive approach of United States to privacy violations).
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federal facilities," in a project that "makes Washington the
first U.S. city to be able to peer across wide stretches of the
city and to create a digital record of images."21 State-of-the-art
cameras allow operators to take advantage of "satellite-based
optics" that enable them to see in the dark, capture words on a
printed page from hundreds of feet away, and peer into build-
ings.' Only a few private cameras have been added into the
mix at this point, but the head of the project states "I don't
think there's really a limit on the feeds [the system] can take;"
further, he wants "to build... the capability to tap into not
only video but databases and systems across the region,"'
eventually moving into any number of schools, businesses and
neighborhoods. 2' All of this is to be accomplished through a
$7,000,000 central control facility, which can then relay the
feeds to nearly 1000 squad cars.25
At present in the United States, only Washington, D.C. has
such a sophisticated system.' But many other American cities
have installed forerunner versions that are far from antiquat-
ed. For instance, Newark, N.J., Tampa, Fl., Virginia Beach,
Va., and Memphis, Tenn., all have cameras, ranging in number
from six to seventy-two, that cover large areas of public real
estate and that can rotate 360 degrees, pan and tilt, and zoom
in on subjects.2 7 Tampa recently added several dozen cameras
'o Hsu, supra note 2, at Cl.
21 Id.
" Id. See also, Editorial, Big Brother in the Capital, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Feb. 20, 2002, at 30A (noting that D.C. cameras do not produce "the blurry vid-
eos of convenience-store crimes [but] digital images from optical technology that
can see in the dark and zoom in on a page of fine print from hundreds of feet
away..).
Hsu, supra note 2, at C1.
Jess Bravin, Washington Police to Play 'I Spy," WALL ST. JOURNAL, Feb.
13, 2002, at B1, B6 (quoting Stephen J. Gaffigan, former Justice Department
Director of Community Policing and head of the Washington Metropolitan Police
Department camera installation project, as stating, 'The next logical extension is
into communities to aid our crime-fighting efforts.").
Id.
"6 Hsu, supra note 2, at C1. But it may already be behind the curve. A digi-
tal system has been developed that allows camera images to be fed to a wireless
laptop operator who can control the camera and other remote devices. New Video
Technology from AXCESS Inc., PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 26, 2002.
27 Marcus Nieto, Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention
220 [VOL. 72
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equipped with face recognition technology that purportedly
matches captured faces with criminal arrest records (although
the city discontinued the program when it failed to produce any
arrests).'i
Many cities and towns are following suit in one way or
another. A 2001 study by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police found that 80% of the 207 responding American
law enforcement agencies have deployed some sort of closed-
circuit television and that another 10% will soon do so.' Much
of this technology is "in-car" video designed to record police
detention activities, or is placed at traffic intersections or in
government buildings.0 But about half the responding agen-
cies use cameras in "high crime areas," 25% use them on
"streets" and 15% use them in "parks."31 It should also be not-
ed that some of the traffic networks, although primarily de-
signed to photograph the license plates of speeders, can peer
inside a vehicle, at areas outside the intersection, and even into
homes and offices alongside the targeted thoroughfares.
All of these cameras are owned by the government (al-
though in some locales they are operated by "volunteers" from
the community). In the private sphere, camera use is even
more widespread. A nationwide survey of a variety of compa-
Tool? CRB-97-005 (California Research Bureau, California State Library, June,
1997), at 14-18, available at httpJ/www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/.
"8 Lane DeGregory, Click. BEEP! Face Captured, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July
19, 2001, at ID. See also infra note 67.
" International Association of Chiefs of Police, Executive Brief, The Use of
CCTV/Video Cameras in Law Enforcement, Executive Summary, March 2001, at 4,
available at http'J/www.theiacp.org/documentspdfs/PublicationsfUseofCCTV.pdf
[hereafter IACP Briefi.
30 Id.
31 Id.
" M.J. Zuckerman, Chances Are, Somebody's Watching You, USA TODAY, Nov.
30, 2000 (describing $ 40 million surveillance center, controlling 110 remote con-
trol cameras in the suburbs of Washington, that can "peer inside a vehicle" and
"easily see into the homes and offices along the interstates").
" Nieto, supra note 27, at 21. In Anchorage, Alaska, for instance, volunteer
video patrols funded by the business community and state grants train cameras
on residential and commercial sections of the city. Id. In Hollywood, California,
cameras are monitored by local residents and Los Angeles Guardian Angels. Id.
at 20.
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nies, taken over five years ago, found that 75% use CCTV sur-
veillance.' That fact becomes important even if the focus is
solely state action, given the above-mentioned capacity to link
these cameras to government command centers.
That is precisely what has happened in Great Britain, the
champion of CCTV surveillance. There are now well over 800
local public video surveillance programs in operation in the
United Kingdom, 5 involving between two and three million
cameras, 36 and creating more video images per capita than
any other country in the world. 7 Between 200,000 and
400,000 of these cameras monitor public areas;38 many are
equipped with zoom lenses that can read the wording on a ciga-
rette packet at 100 yards and bring nighttime images up to
daylight level.39 And the installation of cameras is likely to
continue unabated. Researcher Clive Norris concludes that "in
the first decade of the new millennium, when average Britons
leave their homes what will be remarkable is if their presence
is not seen, their behavior not monitored and their movements
not recorded by the omni-presence of the cameras, CCTV opera-
tors, and video recorders. ° Most of these programs are jointly
operated and managed by law enforcement and the private
sector.4 1 Almost all are linked to police stations, but quite a
few are also monitored by private security guards.4 2 Many oth-
"' Karen Hallberg, Nationwide Survey of Companies With Security Expenses,
Cahners Publishing Company, September, 1996 (on file with author).
This was the estimate in 1996. Nieto, supra note 27, at 7.
36 See Lee, supra note 1, at 7 (reporting that in 2001, Great Britain had
installed 2 million cameras and was planning on spending another $100 million
to install thousands more).
37 Nieto, supra note 27, at S.
38 Simon G. Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has
Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY:
THE NEW LANDSCAPE 150 (Phillip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., MIT Press
1997) (estimating that 200,000 cameras cover public spaces and indicating that
this figure would grow at 20 to 30% annually).
39 id.
o Clive Norris, From Personal to Digital: CCTV, the Panopticon and the Tech-
nological Mediation of Suspicion and Social Control, in SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIAL
SORTING: PRIVACY RISK AND AUTOMATED DISCRIMINATION 11 (David Lyon, ed.
2002).
4' Nieto, supra note 27, at 8.
42 Id.
[VOL. 72
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er European countries have similar systems.4"
Today, these cameras are operated primarily by people.
But the camera systems of the (not-so-distant) future will be
much more automated. Motion detection systems will be able to
discern when movements are out of the "ordinary" and then
alert human assessors, who are thereby spared sifting through
mountains of data." License plate recognition systems will be
able to identify those cars that enter unauthorized areas or
that move in the wrong direction.4" Facial recognition systems,
more sophisticated than the one used in Tampa, will trigger a
signal when people with criminal records, outstanding war-
rants, or inappropriate authorization are spotted.46 Eventually
cameras will even be equipped with "see-through" technology
that can detect when an individual is carrying a gun."
This huge investment in CCTV technology here and abroad
is based on two premises. The first assumption, of course, is
that it enhances public safety. The second is that it does so less
expensively than any equally effective alternative. Both premis-
es are subject to some doubt.
Reports abound of prodigious camera-induced drops in
street crimes, in the 50 to 70% range." But these accounts are
of questionable accuracy (at least those that describe crime
" Id. at 9-10 (describing CCTV programs in Canada, France, Ireland, Spain,
Monaco, Russia, Italy, China, Iran and Iraq).
" CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAxIMUM SURVEI.LANCE SOCIETY:
THE RISE OF CCTV 212-14 (1999)(describing "intelligent scene monitoring").
' Id. at 214-16 (describing "automatic licence plate identification"). This sys-
tem is already in use in London. See id.
Id. at 216-19 (describing "digital facial recognition systems").
See David Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment:
The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 7-8 n.38
(1996Xdescribing this technology).
" See Lee, supra note 1 (reporting British Home Office figures showing a 63%
decline in crime rates in areas where cameras have been installed); Nick Taylor,
Closed Circuit Television: The British Experience, 1999 STAN. TFCH. L. REv. [ 12
(reporting British police claims that car thefts in King's Lynn were reduced by
91%, and general crime in Bedford and Swansea was reduced by 55% and 51%,
respectively); Emelyn Cruz, Video Cameras Shooting Down Some Crime Rates,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 28, 1996 at B-1 (in Tacoma after cameras were in-
stalled, crimes such as assaults, trespassing, prostitution and vandalism dropped
from 244 reported incidents in 1993 to 87 in 1994, and 125 in 1995).
20021
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reduction due to street-based CCTV49 ). A recent commentary
on the reports about the United Kingdom's CCTV system de-
scribes the glowing statistics as "post hoc shoestring efforts by
the untrained and self-interested practitioner." ° More neutral
analysis of the efficacy of public surveillance paints a different
picture. A meta-review of thirteen of the better-conducted
studies carried out in that country through 2000 concluded that
"the criminological evidence as to CCTV's effectiveness in re-
ducing crime does not support the almost exponential increase
in cameras on British streets as a crime prevention mea-
sure." 1 Another recently concluded meta-analysis of the twen-
ty-two most carefully conducted studies in the United Kingdom
and North America indicated that while half of the studies
found a "desirable effect on crime," five found an "undesirable"
effect, and six found no effect or an uncertain effect on crime;
"' Taylor, supra note 48, at 1 13-14. The success of CCTV in stores, trans-
portation centers and the like is better documented. For instance, London's
Gatwick Airport saw a 78% drop in crime in its car parks after cameras were
installed, and Chesterfield railway station a drop in vehicle crime of 96%. Ste-
phen Wright, Police Release CCTV Images of BBC Presenter, DAILY MAIL (Lon-
don), May 3, 1999, at 2. But even here the effectiveness of CCTV is not proven
beyond doubt. See Emma Short & Jason Ditton, Does CCTV Affect Crime?, 2
CCTV TODAY, Mar. 1995, at 11 (1995Xthe results of independent and competently
conducted evaluations of CCTV systems installed in car parks, buses, housing
estates, football stadia and the underground are "fairly contradictory regarding
the effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention method," with some showing no
effect, others showing high levels of displacement rather than overall reduction,
and others showing clear reductions).
0 Ray Pawson & Nick Tilley, What Works in Evaluation Research? 34 BRIT J.
CRIMINOLOGY 291, 294 (1994); see also, Taylor, supra note 48, at 113 (stating that
"the vast number of evaluation schemes that have been carried out to date have
been undertaken by those with an interest in promoting the cameras and have
been technically inadequate").
s Clive Norris, Remarks at a Conference of Experts-Video Surveillance: A
Crime Prevention Instrument in European Comparison 32 (Feb. 22-24,
2001)(manuscript available at Georg-August University, Gottingen, Germany and
from author). Another ironic development is that pictures of crime, captured on
CCTV, may actually make people feel less safe and less willing to frequent the
targeted areas. Jason Ditton, Glasgow City's Cameras-Hype or Help?, ScOTTISH
CENTER FOR CRIMINOLOGY, available at http:www.scotcrime.u-net.com/newsl.htm
(reporting that, when a large sample of people was interviewed one year after
Glasgow installed cameras, "most didn't feel any safer and more said they would
avoid the city centre," and speculating that the publicity from the crimes caught
on camera was partly to blame).
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ultimately, "the average overall reduction in crime was a rather
small four per cent."52
One example of such research comes from Glasgow, one of
the first major cities to adopt CCTV. There, a three-year study
conducted by criminologists found that although crime was
reduced in "certain categories,.., there was no evidence to
suggest that the cameras had reduced crime overall," and "[tihe
cameras appeared to have little effect on clear up rates for
crimes and offences.""3 Anecdotal statistics from the more re-
cent past are equally disappointing. In London, where cameras
abound, even street robberies-the crime CCTV is supposed to
be best at deterring-increased in 2 0 0 2 ." In Sydney, Australia,
a relatively new camera system produced only one arrest every
160 days.
5
American cities have had similar experiences. Early sys-
tems set up in Hoboken, N.J., Mount Vernon, N.Y., Miami, Fl.,
Charleston, S.C., and Detroit, Mich., were discontinued because
they were not cost effective.5" Cameras in Times Square were
dismantled after producing fewer than ten arrests in twenty-
two months. 7 These failures might be attributed, at least in
part, to the primitiveness of the technology used. However,
Oakland, Calif., recently ended its three-year experiment using
high-definition cameras-able to read a flyer hundreds of yards
" Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Crime Prevention Effects of
Closed Circuit Television: A Systematic Review 41 (August, 2002)(Home Office
Research Study 252, on file with author). This study also noted that all five
North American CCTV studies showed no evidence of a desirable effect on crime.
Id. at 42.
"' See Jason Ditton, The Effect of Closed Circuit Television Cameras on Re-
corded Crime Rates and Public Concern About Crime in Glasgow, SCOTTISH CEN-
TER FOR CRIMINOLOGY, available at httpA/www.scotcrim.u-net.com/research.htm.
" UPI, "Spy" Cameras vs. Villains in Britain (Mar. 8, 2002), available at
http:www.gyre.orgnews/cache/1885. This article also notes that in London's
Newham district, with 300 cameras, street crime in 2001 increased by one-fifth
over the previous year, and car thefts increased by 3.6%.
' Bruce Andrews, Here's Looking at You, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 26,
2001, at 16, available at 2001 WL 31626512.
" Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You're on Candid Camera: Privacy and
Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 1079, i103 (1997).
'" Id. See also Maureen O'Donnell, Cameras Around Every Corner, CHICAGO
SuN-TIMEs, Feb.18, 1996, at 2, available at 1996 WL 6732224.
2002]
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away and a license plate more than a mile away-because it
had no "conclusive way to establish that the presence of video
surveillance cameras resulted in the prevention or reduction of
crime." 58
There are many reasons why cameras might not be effec-
tive at reducing crime in the areas on which they are trained.
To understand why, consider the three ways cameras can, in
theory, be useful: (1) they might help spot incipient crime that
can be prevented, or at least solved, through immediate action;
(2) they might create a record of crime that can be used in
identifying and convicting perpetrators at some later point in
time; and (3) they might deter crime. In each of these three
areas, obstacles to smooth functioning exist.
Cameras' ability to help immediately nab potential or actu-
al perpetrators is circumscribed by a number of factors. Cam-
era operators may not observe crime in the targeted area be-
cause the cameras have been destroyed or tampered with,59
bad lighting or obstacles prevent good viewing (e.g., drug trans-
actions carried out between cars),'o or the operator is distract-
ed6' or unable to recognize what is happening in ambiguous
" Cameras in the District of Columbia: Before the House Comm. on Gov. Re.
forms, 107th Cong. 3 (2002)(statement of Johnny Barnes, Executive Director,
ACLU of National Capital Area)(quoting Report of Joseph Samuels, Jr., Chief of
Police, Oakland Police Department to Oakland City Council), available at
http://www.aclu.org/congress/1032202a.html.
"' Liz Kay, Camera Becomes New Weapon in War on Graffiti Vandalisnm Offi-
cials Say the Motor Sensing Device Deters Taggers, but Critics Say It Just Pushes
the Problem to New Location, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2001, at B4, available at 2001
WL 28939163 (quoting a detective saying that gang members "rip [the cameras]
off. They break them, they turn them, they shoot them up. It's more of a game
for them. If they are going to do their illegal activity, they are going to make
sure [the cameras] are not working.").
60 See UPI, supra note 54 (quoting one official who said "[t]here are hundreds
of thousands of nooks and crannies left" that cameras cannot view, and noting
that some criminals "are targeting luxury cars on the move so that any view the
cameras gets of them is fleeting at best" and that "[o]thers conceal their street
muggings by grabbing their targets in a clinch that, on CCTV, looks like nothing
more than a romantic hug.").
6" According to Norris & Armstrong:
It is not possible for one or even two operatives to continuously monitor
the output of a twenty-camera system and, of course, as soon as they
selectively focus on one incident, other screens are going unmonitored.
This is exacerbated by the inherent boredom of watching dozens of
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situations.62 If operators do see something suspicious, their
distance from the scene sometimes makes them overcautious in
concluding a crime is occurring. And even when incipient
crime is clearly identified, police will not necessarily be de-
ployed. A dearth of sufficiently proximate officers (created in
part by the belief that fewer police are needed when cameras
are present), lack of or poor communication between the con-
trol room and those in the street,6 and even police fear of be-
ing caught on camera and having one's actions misinterpreted
can limit law enforcement response." All of these problems
have their analogues in systems that are more fully automated.
Alarms may not sound because of technological flaws,6 7 or de-
screens and the inattentiveness that results. But even the most attentive
of operators are swamped by the volume of information. For instance . . .
a medium-sized 24-hour city centre system with twenty cameras [gener-
ates] a quite staggering 43 million "pictures" per day.
NORRIS & ARMSTRONG, Supra note 44, at 211.
' See generally Remarks of Thomas Coty (Manager of the National Institute
of Justice Video Sensor and Processing Program), at Meeting of the Security In-
dustry Association and International Association of Chiefs of Police, at 39 (Apr.
17, 2002)(transcript available at http'//www.securitygateway.com/E/E3_5.html [here-
after SIA and IACP Meeting](stating "[Olne of the problems we see in CCTV is
that if it's being operator maintained or monitored, after about twenty minutes
the eyes start to glaze and it's difficult to keep monitoring the monitor.'). Id.
Norris, supra note 40, at 19 (CCTV operatives . . . are . . . always account-
able to justify the request for intervention and, unlike the patrol officer, do not
have the benefit of hindsight, [which] serves to limit requests for deployment to
only those events that can generate the most concrete and strongest justifica-
tions."). Note, however, that operators can be overaggressive in singling out cer-
tain types of suspects. See infra text accompanying notes 147-57.
" See Taylor, supra note 48, at 1 32 (noting that soon after cameras were
introduced in Bingley, Yorkshire, the number of officers based in town was re-
duced from twenty-four to three).
6 Norris & Armstrong, supra note 44, at 166 (concluding that the reason
many suspects reported by a field agent to the camera operator were never locat-
ed by the operator was that "location is often imprecise and descriptions are too
vague to significantly differentiate a suspect from the crowd").
Id. at 188-96 (describing implications of fact that "the practice of street
policing, which traditionally enjoyed low visibility from managerial scrutiny is now
potentially subject to a far more intrusive supervisory gaze").
6 Tampa abruptly suspended its face recognition program after less than two
months, apparently because the system failed to identify correctly a single face in
its database of suspects, and thus did not result in any arrests. The Failure of
Facial Recognition Technology in Tampa, Florida (ACLU Special Report), January
3, 2002, at 1 (on file with author). This report also describes several studies indi-
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ployments may not occur because of human ones.
Attempts to memorialize the crime and the perpetrator on
tape can also run into difficulty. Sometimes tapes are destroyed
before authorities realize they may be helpful in solving
crime." Nor does retention of the tapes guarantee identifica-
tion. Recordings are sometimes of poor quality69 (although, as
noted earlier, digitalization has gone a long way toward rectify-
ing this problem), images caught on tape are always subject to
interpretation (think of the Rodney King video70 ), and perpe-
trators are hard to identify even with good images."' Even if
tapes are preserved and the human error factor is assumed
away, obtaining the relevant frames can literally consume days
of effort by the police.72
Finally, cameras cannot be effective deterrents if their
presence is not made known to potential perpetrators, which
apparently is often the case." And even when the cameras'
cating that, to date, the technology has not been very effective. Id. at 3.
' See generally Remarks of Stephen McMahon (Central District Commander
for Baltimore City), SIA & IACP Meeting, supra note 62, at 39 (noting that tapes
are destroyed after ninety-six hours and that tapes of a few "non-crime related"
incidents were therefore lost).
' Kay, supra note 59, at 4 (stating that, with respect to one system, Los
Angeles "[ojfficials have not made any arrests based on photos taken by the cam-
era at any location [because] pictures are seldom clear enough to identify the
person responsible for the graffiti.'); Zuckerman, supra note 32, at 1A (noting that
tape at ATM machine had been used so many times that image of person using
a murder victim's card was too obscured for identification purposes).
" Although the tape clearly showed officers beating King, it did not capture
the high speed chase and King's aggressive actions prior to the beating. See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 38-41 (1996Xrecounting the behav-
ior of King and the officers prior to the videotaping); see also The 1991 Rodney
King Police Brutality Case and the Los Angeles Riots, at http'J/www.crimsonbird.
com/history/rodneyking.html (discussing police chase and subsequent beating).
" Zoe Henderson et al., Matching the Faces of Robbers Captured on Video, 15
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 445 (2001)(reporting research finding that match-
ing unfamiliar faces from both high- and low-quality CCTV with photographs is
"highly error-prone').
" Norris, supra note 40, at 17 (recounting one case which involved 4000-man
hours of video analysis), & at 35 (noting that multiplexing cameras, a common
efficiency procedure that takes only a few frames per second from each of many
cameras, produces a loss of information that can make incident spotting difficult);
cf. State v. Bonnell, 856 P.2d 1265, 1271 (Haw. 1993)(describing accumulation of
fifty videotapes with twelve hundred hours of footage, containing just one minute
of conduct that might have reflected gambling activity).
"' Jason Ditton & Emma Short, Evaluating Scotland's First Town Centre
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presence is conspicuous, certain types of offenders are too pre-
occupied or dense to notice, or are oblivious (as with rowdy
revelers) 4 or uncaring (as with nighttime prowlers who wear
masks, wigs, or other disguises).75 A 1995 study reported that
criminals believe the presence of cameras is the least of their
concerns in considering whether to rob businesses.76 Also of
note is that the presence of cameras may simultaneously re-
duce surveillance by citizens, who assume that the cameras
will do the job.
77
Findings that crime has dropped in areas exposed to cam-
eras must also be tempered by two facts. In some studies, part
of the crime reduction was undoubtedly due to other factors,
including additional crime control measures undertaken at the
time the cameras were installed and decreasing crime rates
overall.78 Second, many of these studies did not take into ac-
CCTV Scheme, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRcUIT TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CON-
TROL (Clive Norris et al., eds., 1998)(after a year of cameras in Glasgow's town
center, "only between a quarter and a third of the ambulatory population were
even aware of their existence"); John Naughton, Video Eyes Are Everywhere: "Big
Brother" in Britain, THE OBSERVER (U.K), Nov. 13, 1994, at 13 (noting that most
people in Britain are unaware of the extent to which camera surveillance occurs).
' Chris Arnot, We've All Been Framed: It's Not Big Brother Who's Watching
Over Us-It's All His Young Siblings, Monitoring Our Every Move in Public (and
Many Private) Places, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Dec. 13, 1999 (stating "[wihen young
men have had between five and 10 pints of lager and their honour is challenged,
the presence of a camera makes no difference.").
"' See also, Emma Short & Jason Ditton, Seen and Now Heard- Talking to
the Targets of Open Street CCTV, 38 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 404, 418-20
(1998Xnoting that eight of thirty criminals interviewed claimed CCTV cameras
had no effect on their pattern of offending, with others saying they committed of-
fenses outside of camera range, and a "small minority" saying they gave up of-
fending altogether).
" See Nieto, supra note 27, at 11 (discussing the results of a study undertak-
en by Rosemary Erickson of the Athena Research Corp.).
" Stephen Graham, Towards the Fifth Utility? On the Extension and
Normalisation of Public CCTV, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CmRcurr TELEVISION AND
SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 73, at 89, 106 ("Anecdotal evidence has already
emerged that the Newcastle West End scheme has significantly cut phone calls to
the police, because local residents assume that the CCTV system will have spot-
ted any event, anywhere, and at any time.").
"I For instance, Tacoma, Wash., one of the few American cities that has kept
crime statistics and reported significant reductions as a result of CCTV, see supra
note 48, added street lights, removed graffiti and cleaned up vacant lots at the
same time it installed cameras. Burrows, supra note 56, at 1124 n.361. In Wash-
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count the possible "displacement" effect of the cameras, despite
the likelihood that any crime that surveillance does deter is
simply pushed into an area that does not have cameras. 79
These observations should not lead to the conclusion that
public video surveillance has little or no impact on crime. Al-
though law enforcement statistics are probably inflated (on
those few occasions when they exist°), it must be acknowl-
edged that even more careful, privately conducted studies indi-
cate that some cities experience a noticeable reduction in of-
fense rates after camera installation. For instance, the town
center of Airdrie, Scotland experienced a 21% drop in crime
over the two year period after cameras were set up, with no
obvious evidence of displacement, and after factoring out other
explanatory variables such as a drop in overall crime rates."
ington, D.C., a crime cleanup on Rhode Island Avenue was 'jumpstarted by the
camera but it then was followed up with a lot of other action." John Thompson
(Lieutenant Colonel in United States Army), SIA & IACP Meeting, supra note 62,
at 12; see also, Ben Brown, Closed Circuit Television in Town Centres: Three Case
Studies, 68 POLICE RES. SERIES 37 (1995)(stating that in Birmingham efforts were
made at "pedestrianisation" of key areas of the city center at the same time cam-
eras were installed), available at httpJ/www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rdsorgpdfs/
fcdps68.pdf); Norris, supra note 51, at 16 ("the rapid growth of the number of
CCTV systems [in the United Kingdom] (between 1993 and 1997) occurred at
precisely the same time as the only sustained fall in recorded crime since the
1950s"). The latter paper recounts a number of other reasons reported crime re-
ductions may not be accurate or not attributable to CCTV.
"' See David Skinns, Crime Reduction, Diffusion and Displacement: Evaluating
the Effectiveness of CCTV, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND
SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 73, at 185 (noting that although the town center
experienced a 16% reduction in crime after camera installation, crime in the sur-
rounding townships jumped by 31%, so that overall reduction was only 6%);
Brown, supra note 78, at 35 ("Since the installation of cameras, the incidence of
[street robbery, theft from the person and theft from a motor vehicle] in areas
surrounding zone A has increased sharply, and by the end of the study period,
the number of offences per month is over three times as high as when the cam-
eras were installed."); Chris Sarno, The Impact of Closed Circuit Television on
Crime in Sutton Town Centre, in TOWARDS A SAFER SurON? CCTV ONE YEAR
ON (Marjorie Bulos & Doug Grant eds., 1996)(reporting that after camera installa-
tion street thefts declined by 7%, but thefts inside commercial premises increased
by 30%).
'o IACP Brief, supra note 29, at 5 (96% of the U.S. agencies surveyed by the
IACP "do not incorporate measurement systems of any kind" to determine the
effect of CCTV on crime rates).
81 Emma Short & Jason Ditton, Does Closed Circuit Television Prevent Crime?
An Evaluation of the Use of CCTV Surveillance Cameras in Airdrie Town Center,
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Newscastle experienced significant drops in particular crimes:
35% for criminal damage, 50% for motor vehicle theft, and 56%
for burglary, compared to 25%, 39% and 39% reductions for the
same crimes in the control areas.8 2 A third United Kingdom
study found a 25% drop in crime sustained over a two-year
period, with no displacement effects.83 Although these figures
are significantly lower than initial law enforcement claims,'
they are nonetheless impressive. 5
When all the data are looked at closely, a fair conclusion is
that well-positioned, sophisticated cameras, run by competent
staff, might be able to reduce some types of street crime, partic-
ularly theft, by 10 to 25% in "high crime areas," compared to
similar public areas that have no cameras, with only a small
displacement effect.8" The second question that must be an-
swered by careful policymakers is whether this reduction is
cost-effective. Could other alternatives, such as more patrols,
better lighting and greater community participation in law en-
forcement, achieve equal or better results at less cost?
I will not try to answer that question here. Some informa-
tion about the cost of CCTV can provide a useful starting point,
THE SCOTTISH OFFICE CENTRAL RESEARCH UNIT (1995), available at
http:l/www.scotland.gov.uk/cur/resfmds/crf08-OO.htm.
See Brown, supra note 78, at 17. Brown also notes, however, that the de-
cline in vehicle thefts in the CCTV area "appears to fade after 8 months and the
number of thefts of vehicles rises sharply." Id. at 20.
' Rachel Armitage et al., Burnley CCTV Evaluation, in SURVEILLANCE OF
PUBLIC SPACE: CCTV, STREET LIGHTING AND CRIME PREVENTION (Kate Painter &
Nick Tilley eds., 1999).
Arnot, supra note 74 (noting that law enforcement claimed a 74% crime
drop in Airdrie).
' But see Norris, supra note 51, at 26-27 (noting that a number of other
well-done studies obtained "mixed results" compared to these "unequivocal success
stories"). In fact, several studies showed that cameras had no overall impact on
crime. Id.
6 Although not based on controlled studies, statements by American police
officials are consistent with this conclusion. Remarks of Stephen McMahon, supra
note 68, at 4 (noting reductions of 18 and 25% in first two years of CCTV pro-
gram in Baltimore); Remarks of Joseph Dunne (Chief of Housing Police, New
York City), SIA & IACP Meeting, supra note 62, at 21 (noting reduction of 25%
in first 6 months of camera use in New York housing projects). But see supra
note 52 (describing meta-study which concluded that U.S. studies have consistent-
ly found that CCTV does not reduce crime).
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 231 2002-2003
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
however. In the United Kingdom, a number of local authorities
have yearly operating budgets of well over $500,000 for camera
systems that cover downtown areas.8 7 The annual budget of
each of the several 100-camera systems in New York City hous-
ing projects is approximately $850,000 just for staffing (i.e., not
including the upfront costs of the cameras, their maintenance,
new tapes, tape storage, and associated expenditures)."
Whether equally effective alternatives would be cheaper is
harder to calculate. But it can be noted that even a relatively
successful CCTV system may not "pay" for itself. One study
indicated that good CCTV systems can make significant dents
in shoplifting, but that the value of merchandise retained
would not equal expenditures on such a system for nearly five
years; s9 as one researcher noted, "it might be more rational to
just accept the losses."' Where violent crime is concerned that
kind of reasoning is less palatable, and expensive surveillance
systems might be endorsed if even just a few such crimes will
be prevented or detected.91 Unfortunately, however, violent
crimes are probably the most difficult offenses for cameras to
prevent or deter, given their often spontaneous nature.92
"' G. Wade, Funding CCTV: The Story So Far, 7 CCTV TODAY (1998), at 28
(stating that several local townships are "dealing with operating budgets in excess
of £500,000 per year").
" Remarks of Joseph Dunne, supra note 86, at 22.
g Norris, supra note 51, at 23 (describing a study by A. Beck & A. Willis,
Crime and Security: Managing the Risk to Safe Shopping (1995)).
Id.
g' See Davies, supra note 38, at 150 (quoting a Home Office spokesman who,
in commenting on the potential of CCTV, stated "if this all saves just one life,
it's worth it."). Widespread CCTV could also help apprehend individuals like the
sniper who recently terrorized Washington, D.C., although such individuals would
probably be adept at avoiding overtly positioned cameras.
g Vaseekaran Sivarajasingam & Jonathan P. Shepherd, Effect of Closed Cir-
cuit TV on Urban Violence, 16 J. ACCIDENT & EMERG. MED. 255 (1999)(finding in
a study of three Welsh cities "an overall reduction in town/city centre vio-
lence . . of 1% in the 2 years after closed-circuit TV installation," which the
authors concluded meant that CCTV "had no obvious influence on levels of as-
saults," a finding they said was consistent with the British Crime Survey finding
of "no overall change" in rates of urban violence following the installation of pub-
lic surveillance devices); Norris & Armstrong, supra note 44, at 166-67 (finding
that although 38% of the 45 deployments they witnessed were for violent action,
most of them were fist fights and none involved death or required an ambulance).
[VOL. 72
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 232 2002-2003
PUBLIC PRIVACY
In sum, it is not clear that public surveillance using camer-
as is always a worthwhile investment from a public safety per-
spective. That conclusion is unlikely to slow the continued
proliferation of such surveillance, however. "Common sense"
judgments, which view the efficacy of cameras systems as a
foregone conclusion, are likely to dominate any debate on the
matter.' Politicians will continue to point to cameras as a
"silver bullet" method of crime prevention. 4 Recent terrorist
attacks will only add to the pressure to provide protection
through surveillance.95 Although, as noted above, some cities
have terminated CCTV programs that have failed to reduce
crime, there is also the possibility that once the newer, more
expensive systems are set up, inertia will prevent their disas-
sembly even in the face of proven ineffectiveness. The primary
question is not whether such systems will be installed or main-
tained, but whether and how their use will be regulated.
B. Current Legal Regulation of Public Camera Surveillance
Meaningful legal strictures on government use of public
surveillance cameras in Great Britain, Canada, and the United
States are non-existent. Great Britain's Code of Practice sets
out operating standards "but has no mechanism for account-
ability or enforcement.' Similarly, while governments in On-
Burrows, supra note 56, at 1106 (quoting a property owner who was a
catalyst in implementing a CCTV system in Los Angeles as stating "Iylou can't
commit crimes if you know Big Brother is watching you.").
" Davies' comments about government attitudes in the United Kingdom are
instructive:
The government has placed video surveillance at the center of its law-
and-order policy.... CCTV is quickly becoming an integral part of crime-
control policy, social control theory, and "community consciousness." It is
widely viewed as a primary solution for urban dysfunction. It is no exag-
geration to conclude that the technology has had more of an impact on
the evolution of law enforcement policy than just about any other technol-
ogy initiative in the past two decades.
Davies, supra note 38, at 151.
' Lisa Guernsey, Living Under an Electronic Eye, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001,
at G1, col. 5 (describing poll conducted after September 11, 2001, that showed
increased public support for giving up "some personal freedoms in order to make
the country safe from terrorist attacks," and that showed increased support for
governmental monitoring of e-mail and phone conversations on a regular basis).
" Davies, supra note 38, at 152; see also, Taylor, supra note 48, at 1 35 &
2002]
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tario, British Columbia, and Alberta, Canada, have adopted
very extensive guidelines governing camera and tape use, stor-
age, training, and the like-all of which are framed in terms of
what governments "must" or "should" do-ultimately they are
merely precatory; no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions
attach if they are breached.97 A few American cities have
adopted "guidelines" as well, again none of them enforceable.'
In a recent meeting of the International Association of Police
Chiefs, relatively comprehensive model rules were drafted, but
the premise of the meeting was that "voluntary guidelines" are
sufficient."
n.52 (stating that "the use of public space visual surveillance in Britain remains
largely outside of the law," although noting that storage of surveillance results
may be covered by statute); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1461, 1539 (2000)("The world leader in the deployment of surveil-
lance cameras, the United Kingdom, has some of the strictest data protection
rules in the world, but this has done little or nothing to slow the cameras'
spread.).
97 GUIDELINES FOR USING VIDEO SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS IN PUBLIC PLACES
(2001), available at http'J/www.ipc.on.ca/english/pubpres/papers/video-gd.pdf. These
guidelines were promulgated by the Information and Privacy Commissioner, On-
tario, Canada. The introduction to the Guidelines state that [t]hese Guidelines
build on those developed by" the governments of British Columbia and Alberta,
Canada. Id. For the most part, they are a good model for CCTV regulation. Fur-
ther, in section 8, they provide for "regular audits" to "address the institution's
compliance with the operational policies and procedures." Id. They also state that
"fain external body may be retained in order to perform the audit" and that
"[a]ny deficiencies or concerns identified by the audit must be addressed immedi-
ately." Id. But there are no provisions regarding sanctions if the audit reveals
misconduct.
Remarks of John Firman (Director of Research for the International Associ-
ation of Chiefs of Police), SIA & IACP Meeting, supra note 62, at 32 ("the mas-
sive amount of policies, procedures and guidelines in place with eighteen thou-
sand law enforcement agencies all over the country are voluntary'). The bigger
problem is the complete lack of rules in many jurisdictions. The IACP survey
indicated that 53% of the respondents had no formal written guidelines or policies
governing use of CCTV. IACP Brief, supra note 26, at 9.
99 See GUIDELINES FOR CLOSED CIRcurr TELEVISION (CCTV) FOR PUB. SAFETY
AND COMMUNITY POLICING (Proposed Official Draft No. 9, 2000), available at
http'//www.securitygateway.com/E/E3..2.html (calling for an internal "system of
review or audit"); Remarks of Lessing Gold (Moderator), SIA & IACP Meeting,
supra note 62, at 19 (describing framework for developing IACP Guidelines on
CCTV); see also Remarks of Barry Steinhardt (Associate Director and Chair of
Cyber-Liberties Task Force, ACLU), SIA & IACP Meeting, supra note 62, at 33
("Voluntary guidelines are cold comfort to someone who has their rights violated
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The one American statute that deals specifically with video
surveillance of public activities comes from Arizona."°° That
law makes it a misdemeanor for a person to use video "surveil-
lance" in a public place without prominently and legibly posting
notice that such surveillance is taking place."°1 The statute
exempts journalists from this prohibition, but not law enforce-
ment.0 2 As the language indicates, however, if notice of the
surveillance is posted then the law is not violated, and no other
strictures are placed on the operation of the cameras or on
access to surveillance results.3  Apparently no other states or
municipalities have adopted anything similar to this relatively
undemanding law."°
A principal reason for the virtually unanimous resistance
to a tougher stance on public video surveillance in the United
States is the assumption that courts are not likely to find un-
regulated public camera viewing inimical to the Constitution or
any other established body of law. Video surveillance of the
home interior and similar areas is probably governed by the
and who wants to go to court to have those rights enforced.").
1- ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3019 (2001)
101 Id.
'" Id. It also exempts surveillance of people who have given written consent to
the surveillance, but not, somewhat surprisingly, presumptively consensual video
of activities such as family gatherings and the like when conducted by people
who are involved in the gathering. Id.
103 Id.
104 Remarks of Thomas Lambert (Attorney), SIA & IACP Meeting, supra note
62, at 50 ("there really isn't currently any statute that expressly deals with
CCTV use"). In 2002, the Virginia legislature considered a statute that would
require a judicial order for the use of facial recognition technology outside of cor-
rectional institutions. See HB 454 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002)(seeking to
add §§ 19.2-70.4 et seq. to the Virginia statutes). California law prohibits at-
tempts to capture the image of a person "engaging in a personal or familial activ-
ity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of
whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other
physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the
visual or auditory enhancing device used was use of cameras to record a person."
CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1708.8(b) (1999). A number of other states have similar laws,
but "[olverhelmingly, . ... this protection does not extend to the public space."
Lance E. Rothenberg, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the
Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the
Public Space, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1127, 1145 (2000).
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Fourth Amendment. 5 But all courts that have considered
application of the Fourth Amendment to cameras aimed at
public streets or other areas frequented by a large number of
people have declared that such surveillance is not a search, on
the ground that any expectation of privacy one might have in
these areas is unreasonable."° A few courts have noted that
particularly intrusive public surveillance might implicate the
Fourth Amendment, but all have shied away from so hold-
ing.07 Similarly, some courts have held that Title III, which
" See, e.g., United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir.
199OXholding "the general fourth amendment requirements are still applicable to
video surveillance" of the home); Ricks v. State, 537 A.2d 612, 620 (Md.
1988)(discussing applicability of Fourth Amendment to video surveillance of the
home). Cf Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)(holding that use of a ther-
mal imaging device to discern the contents of the home is a Fourth Amendment
search). But see infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
1" See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3 1269, 1281 (10th Cir.
2000)(covert video cameras on a telephone pole overlooking outside of defendants'
residences); U.S. v. Reed, No. 99-16439, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22684, *8 (9th
Cir. 2000)(covert video of shared hallway of an apartment complex); United States
v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (unmanned video in national forest); Ro-
driguez v. United States, 878 F.Supp. 20, 24 (S.D.N.Y.1995)(covert video surveil-
lance of activities on public street); Vermont v. Costin, 720 A.2d 866, 867 (Vt.
1998Xcovert video of private but unposted fields 150 yards from defendant's
house); State v. Augafa, 992 P.2d 723, 732-33 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999)(video of de-
fendant on public sidewalk using camera on a pole nearby); McCray v. State, 581
A.2d 45, 47-48 (Md. App. 1990)(covert video of defendant crossing the street). See
also, Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. 110 F.3d 174, 181 (1st Cir.
1997)(covert video of workers in an "open and undifferentiated work area"); Michi-
gan v. Lynch, 179 Mich. App. 63, 445 N.W.2d 803 (1989)(covert video of common
area of restroom); Young v. State, 849 P.2d 336, 340-42 (Nev. 1993Xcovert video
of doorless bathroom stall); Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dept., 49 Mich.App.
162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973Xcovert video of defendant talking in public bar); State
v. Bailey, 2001 WL 1739445, *2-3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001) (surveillance of commer-
cial storage facility). Even video surveillance of the curtilage may not implicate
the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp 593 (D.D.C.
1972)(video of backyard not a search); People v. Wemette, 728 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (videotaping defendant on his open front porch exposed to
plain view of public did not infringe any reasonable expectation of privacy); State
v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 320-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1998Xvideotape of front yard
from neighbor's window not a search). But see U.S. v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d
248 (5th Cir. 1986) (prolonged video surveillance of backyard is a search).
" See, e.g., Costin, 720 A.2d at 870 ("this is not a case where video surveil-
lance is aimed indiscriminately at public places and captures lawful activities of
many citizens in the hope that it will deter crime or capture what crime might
occur"); Augafa, 992 P.2d at 737 n.14 (after noting that the camera's zoom capaci-
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governs electronic eavesdropping, applies (with some modifica-
tions) to video surveillance of the home and similarly private
locations,"°8 but none has held that it also applies to surveil-
lance of public activities.
It is worth noting that no court has considered a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a CCTV system, and that most of the
decisions holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
shorter-term, spot surveillance have involved covert, rather
than overt, camera use." But the bottom line is that legisla-
tures have not enacted meaningful regulation of public video
surveillance by the government, and the courts have been un-
willing to nudge them in that direction. That should change.
II. THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC ANONYMITY
Suppose that the local police in a particular jurisdiction were
to decide to station a police car at the entrance to the parking
lot of a well-patronized bar from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every
business day for the purpose of making a list of the license
plates of cars that were driven in and parked in the lot dur-
ing that time.... If we assume that the bar has the neces-
sary liquor license to sell drinks, that nothing more is known
about the individuals patronizing the bar than that they
happen to drive into its parking lot at this hour, and that
there are no other special circumstances present, I would
guess that the great majority of people who might have the
question posed to them would say that this is not a proper
police function.... [Tihere would be an uneasiness, and I
think a justified uneasiness, if those who patronized the bar
felt that their names were being taken down and filed for
future reference.... [Tihis ought not to be a governmental
function when the facts are as extreme as I put them."
ty probably did not play a major role in defendant's arrest, stating "there may be
circumstances under which video camera surveillance, even in a public place, may
constitute an unconstitutional intrusion violative of our state constitution's guar-
antee against unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy.")
108 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
109 See cases cited supra note 106.
no William H. Rehnquist, Is An Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with
Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby,
2002]
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These words were written by William Rehnquist, soon after
he was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1972.
He is right that overt police monitoring of the comings and
goings of individuals for no apparent reason is not an appropri-
ate government function; as he says later in his article, the
"interest in not having public activities observed and recorded
may prevail in the absence of any governmental justification
for the surveillance.""' The only thing wrong about the pas-
sage set out above is that the hypothesized fa~ts are not "ex-
treme." They describe a practice that would be quite feasible
and even routine with any video surveillance system that open-
ly records public activity.
Rehnquist also asserted that the individual interest in-
volved in this situation, although deserving of protection, is not
"privacy," because the observed action "is not intended to be
concealed or confidential and is not in fact concealed or
confidential.""' It is true that no particular trip to the bar is
concealed. But it is also true that those who make trips to the
bar think that their observers either will not know or care who
they are, or will be acquaintances or other bar patrons readily
distinguishable from impersonal government observers bent on
collecting information. Those who patronize bars or any other
establishment both expect, and normally can count on, conceal-
ment from the latter type of observation. If the "uneasy" reac-
tion to which Rehnquist refers is not based on a sense of priva-
cy invasion, it stems from something very close to it-a sense
that one has what I will call "a right to public anonymity."
Anonymity, literally, means nameless."' The right to
public anonymity provides assurance that, when in public, one
will remain nameless-unremarked, part of the undifferentiated
crowd-as far as the government is concerned. The right is sur-
23 KAN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1974).
.. Id. at 14. Rehnquist also states, "I think almost all of us would regard this
as simply not the kind of governmental interest that ought to rate high in a free
society." Id. at 11.
112 Id. at 9.
"I WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 47 (1977)(defining anonymous as
"having or giving no name").
[VOL. 72
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rendered only when one does or says something that merits
government attention, which most of the time must be some-
thing suggestive of criminal activity. "
The association of public anonymity with privacy is not
new. In his seminal study of privacy, Peter Westin years ago
described anonymity as a "state of privacy" that "occurs when
the individual is in public places or performing public acts but
still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and surveil-
lance.""5 Westin continued:
He may be riding a subway, attending a ball game, or walk-
ing the streets; he is among people and knows that he is be-
ing observed; but unless he is a well-known celebrity, he does
not expect to be personally identified and held to the full
rules of behavior and role that would operate if he were
known to those observing him. In this state the individual is
able to merge into the "situational landscape.""
While most would probably agree with the intuitions of
Rehnquist and Westin that we expect some degree of anonymi-
ty in public, the burden of this article is to establish a constitu-
tional right to such anonymity. I will do so from three perspec-
tives. First, I show how indiscriminate technological public
surveillance seriously undermines the way we would like our
society to function, because of its effect on public anonymity.
Second, I argue that a number of constitutional principles,
while not explicitly recognizing a right to public anonymity,
provide solid groundwork for it. Finally, I report the results of
an empirical study that suggests that American citizens feel
public camera surveillance by the government is more intrusive
than a variety of other police actions that the Supreme Court
has labeled a "search" or "seizure," a finding that bolsters the
case for folding the right to anonymity into the Fourth
Amendment's protections.
"' The right might also give way to prevent harm to others that is not crimi-
nal (e.g., an impending accident), or when a person needs medical attention, etc.
15 ALLAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (Bodley Mead 1967).
116 Id.
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A. The Impact of Losing Public Anonymity
Anonymity in public promotes freedom of action and an
open society. Lack of public anonymity promotes conformity
and an oppressive society. These sentences summarize the
conclusions of a host of thinkers about public privacy.
1. The Panopticon Analogy
The antithesis of public anonymity is the Panopticon, a
model prison first imagined by Jeremy Bentham." ' The
Panopticon is circular, with the prison cells and walkways
placed around the perimeter and the guard station perched on
top of a tower in the middle, an arrangement which enables a
large number of prisoners to be watched by just a few
guards."8 In theory, every movement of every convict could be
monitored in such a building.
But the genius of this construction is that the guards, who
are hidden by venetian blinds, do not actually have to watch in
order to enforce order. The mere knowledge that one could be
observed converts every prisoner into his or her own warden.
This latter observation is a key point of emphasis for Michel
Foucault, the renowned philosopher and historian, who elabo-
rated extensively on the modern implications of the
Panopticon."9 As he recognized, "[hie who is subjected to a
field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for
the constraints of power; ... he becomes the principle of his
own subjection." 20
Of course, prisoners are subject to rigid rules of discipline,
violation of which can result in serious punishment. "Self-sub-
jection" might not work as well when those in charge of the
11 See IV THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37-172 (John Bowring ed.,
1962X1838-43).
... Id. at 60-64.
-1 See generally MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195-229 (Alan
Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)(1978)
Id. at 202-03. See also, id. at 187 ("It is the fact of being constantly seen,
of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his
subjection.").
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surveillance do not have reprisal power analogous to prison
officials. Foucault asserted, however, that modern society in-
creasingly functions like a super Panopticon, one which "as-
sures the automatic functioning of power," by rendering "its ac-
tual exercise unnecessary."' As both public and private enti-
ties pour more resources into methods of monitoring people and
architecture that facilitates it, Foucault felt, ordinary citizens
aware of this monitoring are likely to feel increasing pressure
to conform to whatever norms the observers are perceived to
endorse. 22
For Foucault, this "panopticism" is not necessarily a bad
thing. He described it as "a functional mechanism that...
improve[s] the exercise of power by making it lighter, more
rapid, more effective," than the older, balder ways of ensuring
appropriate conduct." Through the "subtle coercion" of
panopticism, people can be led to be more productive, efficient
members of society.'24 In the workplace, hospital or school,
the types of situations Foucault had in mind, one can see some
logic in this conclusion. In those locations, specific rules govern
people's actions, rules that might be enforced most efficiently
through surveillance.
To the extent such "subtle coercion" operates on those in
the public byways, however, it can only do damage to cherished
values. To see why, consider first Justice Douglas' comments in
Papachristou v. Jacksonville2' about public vitality in Ameri-
ca:
Walk[ing] and stroll[ing] and wander[ing] . . . are historically
.21 Id. at 201.
122 See id. at 170-176 (discussing how "the exercise of discipline presupposes a
mechanism that coerces by means of observation" in military camps, hospitals,
schools and workshops and factories); id. at 205 ("The Panopticon . . . must be
understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power rela-
tions in terms of the everyday life of men.").
' Id. at 209; see also id. at 202 (in a panoptic regime "it is not necessary to
use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the
worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the
regulations.").
124 Id.
1'2 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
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part of the amenities of life as we have known them....
These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for
giving our people the feeling of independence and self-con-
fidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have digni-
fied the right of dissent and have honored the right to be
nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They
have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed,
suffocating silence."
Quoting Walt Whitman and Henry David Thoreau, among
others, Douglas painted a picture of a society that thrives on
free-spiritedness in public.
12 7
Now consider, in contrast, some of the effects that Foucault
ascribes to the "discipline" that he says comes from
panopticism. He tellingly calls this discipline "an anti-nomadic
technique.""2 Because it inhibits behavior, it "arrests or regu-
lates movements [and] dissipates compact groupings of indi-
viduals wandering about the country in unpredictable
ways ... . '129 It also can "neutralize the effects of counter-
power that spring from [the multiple organizations in society]
and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to domi-
nate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coali-
tions-anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions."30
These effects are inconsistent, to put it mildly, with Douglas'
vision of the conditions that a democratic, open society wants to
nurture in its public spaces.
2. The Effects of Being Watched
How, more specifically, does panopticism undermine public
openness? Foucault does not answer this question in detail.
Others have, in ways that are directly relevant to public cam-
era surveillance. Shoshana Zuboff writes about the phenome-
22 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
12 Id. at 164 (noting Whitman's "Song of the Open Road," Vachel Lindsay's "I
Want to Go Wandering," and an excerpt from Henry David Thoreau about the
"successful saunterer").
1'2 Foucault, supra note 119, at 218.
m Id. at 219.
130 Id.
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non of "anticipatory conformity" among persons who believe
they are being watched.131  Similarly, philosopher Jeffrey
Reiman states that "[wihen you know you are being observed,
you naturally identify with the outside observer's viewpoint,
and add that alongside your own viewpoint on your action. This
double vision makes your act different, whether the act is mak-
ing love or taking a drive."132 These observations suggest that
any number of individuals-ranging from political
demonstrators,133  to couples-in-love and carefree teenag-
ers1-could be inhibited by the knowledge their actions may
be captured on camera.
"Double vision" is even more likely when the surveillance
involves not just observation but recording of one's activities.
For then, Professor Richard Wasserstrom notes, "[n]o matter
how innocent one's intentions and actions at any given mo-
ment..., persons would think more carefully before they did
things that would become part of the record. Life would to this
degree become less spontaneous and more measured." 35 As
... SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF
WORK AND POWER 344- 45 (1988).
13 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration
of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 27, 38 (1995). Reiman goes on to say: "To
the extent that a person experiences himself as subject to public observation, he
naturally experiences himself as subject to public review. As a consequence, he
will tend to act in ways that are publicly acceptable." Id. at 41.
" As Roger Clarke states, "[1leaders of demonstrations in the future should
expect . . . their locations to be transparent to the police." Roger Clarke, While
You Were Sleeping... Surveillance Technologies Arrived, 73 AUSTRALIAN QUAR-
TERLY 1 (2001), available at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.ClarkeDV/
AQ2001.html.
134 These latter kinds of activities are apparently routinely spied upon by cam-
era operators. See DeGregory, supra note 28, at ID (quoting camera operator as
saying, "I've seen it all. Some things are really funny, like the way people dance
when they think no one's looking. Others, you wouldn't want to watch."); NORRIS
& ARMSTRONG, supra note 44, at 129 ("10 percent of all targeted surveillances on
women, and 15 percent of operator-initiated surveillance were for apparently voy-
euristic reasons, outnumbering protective surveillance by five to one."); see also,
id. at 130 ("The 'appreciation' of such public displays [of sex in cars] was a regu-
lar feature of the night shift in one of our suites and not just confined to those
with access to the monitors. Many such encounters could be found on the
'shaggers alley greatest hits tape' which was compiled and replayed for the bene-
fit of those who missed the 'entertainment.").
"33 Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions, in
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Professor Daniel Solove has noted, the behavioral impact of
surveillance is heightened by the reasonable surmise that one's
recorded actions are easily susceptible to aggregation and use
by a faceless bureaucracy."6 Professor Nicolas Burbules simi-
larly notes that "[als people accept the inevitability of being
observed and recorded, their habits change; they change." He
goes on to assert that these changes are even more pervasive
than we might think, because "people carry many of the at-
titudes and self-imposed restrictions of activity from the sur-
veyed public into their private life."'37
The stultifying effect of public surveillance has been noted
by many others."M But spontaneity is not all that could be
hindered by routine public surveillance. Richard McAdams
notes, "[tihe problem drinker who goes to an Alcoholics Anony-
mous meeting, the patient who drives to his psychiatrist's of-
fice, the homosexual who visits a gay bar, the spouse who has a
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 325-26 (Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1984); cf United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 788
(1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting)("Authority is hardly required to support the
proposition that words would be measured a good deal more carefully and com-
munication inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being transmitted
and transcribed. Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well
smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defi-
ant discourse-that liberates daily life.").
13 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1154
(2002) ("What makes this problem [of information collection through surveillance]
significant is the fact that this information is aggregated, that it can be used to
make important decisions about people's lives, that it is often subjected to a bu-
reaucratic process lacking much discipline and control, and that the individual
has scant knowledge of how the information is processed and used.").
... Nicholas C. Burbules, Privacy, Surveillance, and Classroom Communication
on the Internet, available at httpJ/faculty.ed.iuc.edu/burbules/nb/papers/privacy.
html (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
' See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY 124 (1988)(stating that public "anonymity is wrongfully disturbed if unin-
vited attention is paid or drawn to another person without justification," because
that disturbance "impedes individual tasks and purposes"); Stanley I. Berm, Priva-
cy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 26 (J. Ronald
Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971) (The observed "becomes aware of himself as
an object, knowable, having a determinate character [and] is fixed as some-
thing-with limited probabilities rather than infinite, indeterminate possibilities.");
cf, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 152-53 (1999)
("Privacy, or the ability to control data about yourself .. disables the power of
one dominant community to norm others into oblivion").
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rendezvous with another lover, the teenager or adult who skips
school or work to go fishing, would all be exposed if someone
constantly tracked their public movements."" 9 The practice of
seeking secret solace in parks and other public places may also
be circumscribed. 4 None of these activities are illegal, but it
is easy to imagine why those who engage in them might want
to keep them secret.
In addition to its effect on behavior, CCTV might trigger a
number of unsettling emotional consequences. Relying on the
work of Erving Goffman, Jeffrey Rosen notes that "it's consid-
ered rude to stare at strangers whom you encounter in pub-
lic." 141 Staring, whether it occurs on an elevator, on public
transportation or on the street, violates the rules of "civil inat-
tention." 42 The cyclopian gaze of the camera eye may be
equally disquieting, and perhaps more so given the anonymity
of the viewer and the unavailability of normal countermea-
sures, such as staring back or requesting the starer to stop.
The small amount of social science research specifically
aimed at assessing the impact of concerted surveillance tends
to verify that these and other psychological and behavioral
effects can occur. For instance, empirical investigations of the
workplace-one of the contexts Foucault thought might benefit
from panopticism-indicate that even there surveillance has a
downside. Monitored employees are likely to feel less trusted,
less motivated, less loyal, and more stressed than employees
who are not subject to surveillance. 4 ' Whether these findings
13 Richard H. McAdams, Tying Privacy In Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Col-
lective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REv. 297, 322 (1985).
140 Disa Sim, The Right to Solitude in the United States and Singapore: A Call
for a Fundamental Reordering, 22 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L. REv. 443, 468
(2002Xnoting that "[in a crowded society, we are often driven to find peace and
solace in public parks, pubs, and other public places," and asserting that this
practice would be inhibited by wide-open public photography).
"4 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE VIOLATION OF OUR PRIVACY 16
(2000)(citing ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE So-
CIAL ORGANIZATION OF GATHERINGS 84-85, 116 (1963)).
142 Id.
1' The best research in this regard comes from Carl Botan. In one study,
based on the responses of 465 workers in the communications industry, he found
that "[elmployees who are surveilled . . . experience several panoptic effects, in-
cluding a reduced sense of privacy, increased uncertainty [as to job security], and
2002] 245
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would be duplicated in the public surveillance context is not
clear.'" But one could plausibly infer from them that citizens
on the street who are subject to camera surveillance might ex-
perience less confidence in their overall freedom to act, as well
as somewhat diminished loyalty to a government that must
watch its citizens' every public movement. Roger Clarke also
calls attention to the latter possibility in his study of the effects
of widespread surveillance. Among the many consequences of
"dataveillance," as he calls it, are a prevailing climate of suspi-
cion, an increase in adversarial relationships between citizens
and government, and an increased tendency to opt out of the
official level of society. 45
reduced communication." Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveil-
lance: A Model for Predicting Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 308-
09 (1996). The main conclusions of a second study based on the same survey
results, conducted with Professor Vorvoreanu, were as follows:
[Tihe overwhelming meta-message that surveillance seems to send to em-
ployees is that they are distrusted .... In a closely related interpreta-
tion, many employees see surveillance as setting someone, possibly them-
selves, up for dismissal or discipline .... Many subjects also perceive
surveillance as implying that management feels they deserve to be treated
as children .... and heavily surveilled employees reported reduced moti-
vation to do more quantity of work .. . and reduced motivation to do
higher quality work .... Finally, heavily surveilled subjects reported
reduced loyalty to the organization, increased stress at work, and reduced
enthusiasm about even going to work, all of which are supported by
qualitative comments ....
Carl Botan & Mihaela Vorvoreanu, "What Are You Really Saying to Me?" Electron-
ic Surveillance in the Workplace (June 2000)(unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
1" Surveys asking what people think of CCTV routinely produce overwhelming-
ly positive results. See infra note 264-65 and accompanying text. But no survey,
outside of the one reported here, see infra text accompanying notes 272-84, has
focused on CCTV's panoptic effects (and even the study reported here does so
only indirectly). Further, the way survey questions about CCTV have been framed
apparently distorts the results obtained. See Jason Ditton, Public Support for
Town Centre CCTV Schemes: Myth or Reality?, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 73, at 227 (finding that positive
question-framing increased CCTV's acceptance by 20%, and that if that proportion
were subtracted from the 69% positive response in previous professional surveys,
"we have a minority-albeit a very large minority-but only a minority finding
open street city centre CCTV acceptable.").
" Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM
498 (May 1988) available at http:// www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/
CACM88.html).
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To capture the core of these disparate observations, consid-
er again Rehnquist's bar example. The people entering the bar
will feel less trusted, and more anxious, and may even stop
going there. Or try another simple thought experiment. Virtu-
ally all of us, no matter how innocent, feel somewhat unnerved
when a police car pulls up behind us. Imagine now being
watched by an officer, at a discreet distance and without any
other intrusion, every time you walk through certain streets.
Say you want to run (to catch a bus, for a brief bit of exercise
or just for the hell of it). Will you? Or assume you want to
obscure your face (because of the wind or a desire to avoid
being seen by an officious acquaintance)? How about hanging
out on the street corner (waiting for friends or because you
have nothing else to do)?
In all of these scenarios, you will probably feel and perhaps
act differently than when the officer is not there. Perhaps your
hesitancy comes from uncertainty as to the officer's likely reac-
tion or simply from a desire to appear completely law-abiding;
the important point is that it exists. Government-run cameras
are a less tangible presence than the ubiquitous cop, but better
at recording your actions. A police officer in Liverpool, England
may have said it best: A camera is like having a cop "on duty
24 hours a day, constantly taking notes."'4
3. The Government's Use of Surveillance
All of these inhibitory consequences can be produced sim-
ply by setting up a camera system. If the government acts on
what the camera sees, those effects can be significantly en-
hanced. Of course, that is all to the good if the result is preven-
tion of serious criminal behavior. But sometimes government
uses surveillance to achieve more ambiguous ends. Many of the
crimes "solved" through CCTV in England are very minor of-
fenses that are highly subject to discriminatory prosecution,
such as littering, urinating in public, traffic violations, drunk-
enness, loitering, failing to pay parking meters and even under-
age smoking. 147 Indeed, camera use in publicly accessible
148 Quoted in News, CCTV TODAY, May, 1995, at 4.
147 Simon Davies, Welcome Home Big Brother, WIRED, May, 1995, at 58-62,
20021
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malls in that country triggers law enforcement interventions
even when there is no infraction of the criminal law; rather,
the decision is often based on "commercial considerations" that
characterize certain people (beggars, buskers, and groups of
youth) as' "flawed consumers."14 Research suggests that, in
other public areas as well, the impact of surveillance tends to
be the straightforward exclusion of disfavored groups rather
than apprehension or deterrence of criminals.'49
Thus, Professor Jeffrey Rosen concludes, CCTV's primary
use in Great Britain today is not to thwart serious crime but
"to enforce social conformity.""5 ° One consequence, he reports,
is that the cameras are "far less popular among black men
than among British men as a whole." 5' That should be no
surprise to those familiar with the American experience with
loitering laws, stop and frisk practices, and "aggressive patrol-
ling." 52 Others view CCTV as one of the most powerful forces
cited in Graham, supra note 77, at 101.
1" Michael McCahill, The Surveillance Web: The Rise and Extent of Visual
Surveillance in a Northern City (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Hull University), cited
in Norris, supra note 40, at 28 (using this term); see also Alice Wakefield, Situa-
tional Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRiME PREVENTION 125, 133 (Andrew von Hirsch et al.
eds., 2000Xreporting 578 persons excluded from shopping and arts centers during
a five-week period as a result of CCTV-based security system).
14 See Alan Reeve, The Panopticisation of Shopping: CCTV and Leisure Con-
sumption, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRcUIT TELEVISION AND LOCAL CONTROL,
supra note 73, at 78 (reporting that town center managers wanted to use CCTV
primarily to discourage "anti-consumer" people and activities from entering the
center, and that a quarter wanted to exclude political gatherings, youth who want
to "hang out" and beggars); Roy Coleman & Joe Sir, "You'll Never Walk Alone':
CCTV Surveillance, Order and Neo-Liberal Rule in Liverpool City Centre, 51 BRIT.
J. SOC. 623 (2000)(reporting a study leading the authors to conclude that "[tihe
activities targeted, the gathering of intelligence and its dissemination is focused
on recurring categories: youth, 'known and potential' shoplifters, the homeless and
licensed and unlicensed street traders."); Liberty: Who's Watching You? Video
Surveillance in Public Places 1 (London Briefing Paper No. 16, 1989)(on file with
author)(asserting that cameras are designed to deter "large groups, usually young
single people [whose] mere presence is a nuisance to people who want to use the
streets and shopping centres in more conventional ways.").
Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchful State, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 7, 2001, at 38.
1 Id. See also, Taylor, supra note 48, at 31 (reporting that soon after in-
stallation of cameras in Newcastle local residents attacked the community center,
in the belief it housed the camera monitoring room).
... See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the So-
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pushing toward the "purification" of city spaces and their de-
struction as a stage for the "celebration of difference" and disor-
der.15 The end result of all of this is that public spaces are
becoming less public.'
Automated systems that do not depend on human opera-
tors have been hailed as a method of avoiding these biases. 55
But they do not necessarily eliminate racist and other unde-
sirable tendencies, since discretion is still exercised once the
alarm is triggered. Facial recognition systems that are based
simply on whether a person has previously been labeled a
"shoplifter" or "car thief" (sometimes erroneously'56 ) are likely
to exacerbate these tendencies. If one tries to remove the im-
pact of human flaws through full automation (as with the mo-
tion detection systems described earlier), the result is even
more alarming. Such systems are based on rigid categorizations
of behavior. As Norris notes, "they utilize no other logic than
cial Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policy, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775
(1999Xexploring how order maintenance policies reinforce and are reinforced by
preconceived notions of African-American criminality).
'" Jon Bannister et al., Closed Circuit Television and the City, in SURVEIL-
LANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND LOCAL CONTROL, supra note 73, at 24-32.
These authors conclude that CCTV "as an urban management tool . .. is part of
the wider urban malaise."
By employing such techniques, by closing ourselves to difference, we run
the unintended and perverse risk of further weakening our capacity to
manage difference. Difference becomes even more threatening. Public so-
ciability is weakened. Spaces become the responsibility of urban manag-
ers, order becomes a good to be accessed through consumption.
Id. at 36.
' Taylor, supra note 48, at 23 ("Shopping malls and city centres are becom-
ing increasingly purified and privatised to the extent that the limits of acceptable
behaviour are being driven by the forces of consumerism. Public spaces are be-
coming increasingly less public.')
... Michalis Lianos & Mary Douglas, Dangerization and the End of Deviance:
The Institutional Environment, 40 BRIT. J. CIMINOLOGY. 261, 266 (2000)("It is the
first time in history that we have the opportunity to experience forms of control
that do not take into account any category of social division .... [A]utomated
environments . . . cannot discriminate among users on other grounds than their
quality as users.").
Amy Herdy, They Made Me Feel Like a Criminal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2001, at 1B (recounting story of police confronting a man erroneously
identified by Tampa's facial recognition system as someone wanted for child
abuse).
20021
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 249 2002-2003
250 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 72
whatever is programmed into their software, and the end point
of such processing is the creation of a binary system of classifi-
cation: access is either accepted or denied; identity is either
confirmed or rejected; behavior is either legitimate or illegiti-
mate."1
57
The implications of these various considerations should not
be overstated. Contrary to the dire predictions of some privacy
advocates, the potential effects of public surveillance are not
Orwellian in magnitude. A principal feature of the society de-
picted in George Orwell's novel 1984 was the ever-present
"telescreen" that relayed citizens' words and conduct back to an
omniscient "ministry."" But the dread that was rampant in
Orwell's fictional Oceania resulted primarily from the percep-
tion that the government was obsessed with severely punishing
amorphously defined "thoughtcrimes" and "facecrimes," often
with death.159 In the real world today, in contrast, the norms
likely to assume importance because of camera surveillance
(aside from standard criminal prohibitions), come from the
1" Norris, supra note 40, at 40-41.
See, e.g., Orwell, supra note 3, at 6-7 (the telescreen "could be dimmed, but
there was no way of shutting it off completely.... [It] received and transmitted
simultaneously. ... You had to live-did five, from habit that became instinct-in
the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in dark-
ness, every movement scrutinized."). Harry Strub, The Theory of Panoptical Con-
trol: Bentham's Panopticon and Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, 25 J. HIST. BEH.
SCI. 40, 44 (1989)("The telescreen ... provided a nearly continuous, permanent
record of virtually all of an individual's actions, however trivial, and thereby rep-
resents the consummation of the panoptical ideal of being able to observe every-
thing.").
159 See, e.g., Orwell, supra note 3, at 19-20:
Whether he wrote DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER, or whether he refrained
from writing it, made no difference... The Thought Police would get
him just the same .... Thoughtcrime, they called it. Thought-crime was
not a thing that could be concealed forever .... In the vast majority of
cases there was no trial, no report of the arrest. People simply disap-
peared, always during the night.... You were abolished, annihilated:
vaporized was the usual word.
See also, Strub, supra note 158, at 44 ("In [the telescreen's] all-seeing function, it
was vastly more sensitive, surpassing the Panopticon's potential of achieving power
over minds: one was aware that even the presence of a forbidden thought
("thoughtcrime") was detectable, betraying the individual by a small gesture or
grimace ("facecrime"), or by more minute emotional signals of guilt such as respira-
tory and heartbeat changes.").
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conscience of the mainstream and the business class, the imagi-
nation of pedestrians and the calculations of technicians, and
they are more likely to result in exclusion from certain areas
than any significant formal punishment.
At the same time, in a society that wants to promote free-
dom of action, camera surveillance-more specifically, concerted,
overt public surveillance using cameras with recording capaci-
ty-is clearly not an unalloyed good, even if it does significantly
reduce crime. People who know they are under government
surveillance will act less spontaneously, more deliberately, less
individualistically, and more conventionally; conduct on the
streets that is outside the mainstream, susceptible to suspi-
cious interpretation, or merely conspicuous-even if perfectly
harmless-will diminish and perhaps even be officially
squelched. Some people subject to public camera surveillance,
perhaps in particular those from minority groups, will feel
significant anxiety and discomfort although innocent of any
crime, and some may react with disdain for government, again
despite and probably because of their innocence."6 Public
camera surveillance undermines an open society because it
circumscribes unordinary behavior and makes every-
one-including the ordinary-more conscious of the government's
presence, at least until behavior is suitably conformed and the
cameras can be forgotten.16' In short, CCTV accelerates the
"disappearance of disappearance. 62
" In an ideal world, perhaps, people would not succumb to these
underenforced norms, implemented solely through the process of being watched
and recorded. But, Professor Reiman notes, "[elven if people should ideally be
able to withstand social pressure in the form of stigmatization or ostracism, it
remains unjust that they should suffer these painful fates simply for acting in
unpopular or unconventional ways." Reiman, supra note 132, at 36.
" Foucault's writings predict this result. The cameras will affect our behavior
and attitudes, and then both their effect and their existence will fade from our
consciousness. We would be changed without realizing how or why. See Burbules,
supra note 137 (noting that, consistent with Foucault's thesis, "few people even
notice any longer how frequently they are monitored through partially hidden
video cameras," despite the fact that this surveillance inhibits "all sorts of activi-
ties-and not only illegal activities").
" Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51
BRrT J. Soc. 605, 619 (2000)("The coalescence of [data collection] practices into
the surveillant assemblage marks the progressive 'disappearance of
2002]
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B. The Constitution and Public Camera Surveillance
Do the potential effects of public camera surveillance on
public anonymity raise constitutional concerns, or are they
merely subconstitutional matters that policymakers can take
into account, or dismiss, at their discretion? Camera surveil-
lance is certainly not as physically intrusive as an arrest or
stop, or as invasive as a search of houses or belongings, the
paradigmatic government actions addressed by the Fourth
Amendment. But its aggregate impact can be equally signifi-
cant, because it affects a much larger number of people. It also
evokes a particularly powerful image, a panoptic approach to
government interaction with its citizens that involves observ-
ing, recording, and categorizing every movement in public.
As Lawrence Tribe has emphasized, the Constitution
should be interpreted with the "constitutive dimension of gov-
ernment action" in mind.1" We should think about the issues
raised by public camera surveillance "in terms of what they say
about who and what we are as a people and how they help to
constitute us as a nation."1" As it turns out, not just the
Fourth Amendment but a number of other provisions in the
Constitution are relevant to that endeavor.
1. Freedom of Speech and Association
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech and
association." Recall Justice Douglas' words in Papachristou
linking wandering and strolling with the right to dissent, non-
conformity, and defiance of submissiveness." Building on
that language, one might argue for a First Amendment right to
be free of the inhibiting effects of camera surveillance in public
disappearance'-a process whereby it is increasingly difficult for individuals to
maintain their anonymity, or to escape the monitoring of social institutions.").
" Lawrence Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 165 (1984).
164 Id.
U.S CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble . . . ').
" See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
[VOL. 72
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unless the government can proffer some justification for it.
Under the Supreme Court's caselaw, however, neither the
speech or association guaranties are likely to provide a basis
for constitutional regulation of most public surveillance, at
least when it is visual only. 67 While conduct alone can be ex-
pressive, the type of conduct normally captured by cameras
apparently does not fit in this category. As the Court stated in
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, "[iut is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for
example, walking down the street, or meeting one's friends at a
shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the
activity within the protection of the First Amendment.""6
Similarly, government inhibition of association is generally not
a violation of the First Amendment unless the group is engaged
in some type of speech activity.'69
However, if public conduct is expressive-for instance, a
speech at a park rally-and public associations are speech-relat-
ed-such as joining the rally-then the First Amendment should
be implicated by camera surveillance. That is because, as the
previous section suggested, such surveillance can chill conduct,
even though it takes place in public and is meant to be seen by
others.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in
Laird v. Tatum. 7 ° There the plaintiffs contended that their
antiwar activities were inhibited by knowledge that the Army
" If cameras are equipped with parabolic audio capacity, so that they can
pick up "private" conversations on the street, their use would probably require a
warrant under both the Fourth Amendment, see infra note 280 and accompanying
text, and Title III, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2X2002Xprotecting oral communications
"by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation"). If audio recording
capacity were used openly, Title III might not be violated, but the types of argu-
ments made below concerning the "chilling" effect of surveillance would be appo-
site.
'a City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
1 Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25 ("we do not think the Constitution recognizes a
generalized right of 'social association' that includes chance encounters in dance
halls ..... Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)] . .. recognizes nothing
more than that the right of expressive association extends to groups organized to
engage in speech that does not pertain directly to politics.").
170 408 U. S. 1 (1972).
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 253 2002-2003
254 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 72
was constructing dossiers on those involved, allegedly as a
means of averting potential civil disorder. Construing the
question to be "whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may
be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of
his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere exis-
tence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-
gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid govern-
mental purpose,' 71 the Court dismissed the case. According
to the five-member majority, the plaintiffs had no standing
because they failed to allege any specific, foreseeable harm,
other than an inchoate fear that the information would
somehow be used against them.172
The Court has since indicated, however, that a government
action the sole effect of which is to chill speech is justiciable
under some circumstances.17 Tatum thus does not necessarily
foreclose a First Amendment argument against camera surveil-
lance. The latter method of data collection is quite different
from the government's efforts in Tatum. Most of the "surveil-
lance" in Tatum consisted of perusing published material and
public records, and the rest involved undercover agents who
attended meetings; 4 furthermore, the plaintiffs in Tatum al-
leged no specific acts by the Army against them,7 7 and may
not have been "chilled" in any event. 7 1 In short, Tatum did
' Tatum, 408 U.S. at 10.
172 Id. at 13-14 ("Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substi-
tute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm").
'7 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 478 (1987)(finding standing to argue that
government labeling of a film as propaganda chilled the showing of the films, but
ultimately finding no First Amendment violation because the labeling "neither
prohibits nor censors the dissemination of advocacy materials").
174 Tatum, 408 U.S. at 6.
' Id. at 9 (Respondents "freely admit that they complain of no specific action
of the Army against them .... So far as is yet shown, the information gathered
is nothing more than a good newspaper reporter would be able to gather by at-
tendance at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publications avail-
able on any newsstand.")
'76 Id. at 13-14 n.7 ([R]espondents . .. have also cast considerable doubt on
whether they themselves are in fact suffering from any . . . chill .... [Ihf respon-
dents themselves are not chilled,... respondents clearly lack that 'personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' essential to standing.").
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not involve overt surveillance. The conspicuous presence of
cameras aimed at participants engaging in First Amendment
activity, in contrast, is closer to the type of "present[] ... com-
pulsion[ 7"' directed at speech that has concerned the Court
in cases where it has found violations of the First
Amendment."8 Although many lower courts have nonetheless
been hostile to First Amendment claims directed at camera
surveillance (at least when it consists solely of photogra-
phy),179 several have upheld standing claims when such sur-
veillance targets individuals, intimidates them, or causes a fall-
off in attendance or membership,' or when the results of the
7 Id. at 11.
... For instance, in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the
Court struck down a government regulation requiring individuals to make a spe-
cial written request to the Post Office for delivery of mail containing communist
literature. According to a unanimous Court, under such a regulation,
any addressee is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature
which federal officials have condemned as "communist political propagan-
da." The regime of this Act is at war with the "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First
Amendment.
Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307; see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963)(finding the First Amendment violated when the city government sent letters
that identified certain books as "objectionable," stated it would turn its list of dis-
tributors of those books over to police, and sometimes sent police officers to see
whether distributors took any action with respect to the books). In both Lamont
and Bantam Books the First Amendment wrong was the government's suggestion
that the speech activity was inappropriate. In the absence of any other justification
(such as public safety), the presence of government-run cameras at a political event
strongly suggests that the government dislikes the message being transmitted, and
will likely inhibit those involved in the observed activity. See supra notes 125-29 &
133 and infra note 180.
'" See, e.g. Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding no justifi-
able controversy where police conducted surveillance of demonstrations and public
vigils and photographed demonstrators); Phila. Yearly Meeting of the Religious
Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975Xno justiciable
controversy where police photographed public meetings and disseminated informa-
tion to other law enforcement agencies).
1" See Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.
1989) (distinguishing Tatum because church suffered diminished membership as a
result of surveillance); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir.
1986Xdistinguishing Tatum because plaintiffs here were targets of surveillance);
cf., U.S. v. Montemarano, 1987 WL 13729 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), where the court stated:
It should be noted that the intrusion upon the spiritual and psychological
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surveillance are released to non-law enforcement entities.'
The chilling phenomenon has also long been recognized in
other settings, particularly in labor cases involving suits under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) against employers
who have photographed or videotaped employees engaging in
authorized strikes and demonstrations. In F.W. Woolworth
Co.,"s2 a representative example, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board concluded that "absent proper justification, the
photographing of employees engaged in protected concerted
activities violates [rules under the NLRA against employer
actions that have a "tendency to coerce"] because it has a ten-
dency to intimidate." 183 More so than mere observation,
"pictorial recordkeeping tends to create fear among employees
of future reprisals."'
As this last statement indicates, these holdings are bound
up with the notion that employers have power over the employ-
ees. But that fact does not distinguish the labor cases from the
public surveillance context. By definition, employer reprisals
against those who engage in "protected concerted activities" are
prohibited; yet the law recognizes that, regardless of "actual
impact," photography can have an intimidating effect on em-
ployees so engaged. The same is true of speech and association
in public. These are protected activities that should not result
in government reprisal. But, understandably, people might not
believe that is so when they know or think government camer-
as will be trained on them if they participate: If the activities
are protected, why does the government need cameras? 85
milieu preceding or following the services was minimized by the lack of a
discernible law enforcement presence, the photographs having been taken
from a concealed location. This is not a situation where uniformed govern-
ment personnel impliedly, or expressly, menaced churchgoers.
Id. at *1.
'81 Tate, supra note 179, at 1338.
182 310 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1993).
'8 Woolworth, 310 N.L.R.B. at 1197.
18 Id. See also, Nat'l Steel v. N.L.R.B., 156 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Road
Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. N.L.R.B., 681 F.2d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir.
1982)(citing cases); Waco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 746, 747 (1984).
1 David Feldman, Secrecy, Dignity or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as Civil
Liberty, 41 C.L.P. 41, 61 (1994Xovert surveillance "carries with it a clearly im-
[VOL. 72
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A second way in which public camera surveillance trenches
on First Amendment rights of speech and association is its
facilitation of the government's ability to pierce the anonymity
of those engaging in expressive conduct. The Court has de-
clared that, absent a significant government justification, a
person who writes a pamphlet' or is involved in collecting
signatures for a petition'87 cannot be required to reveal his or
her name. It has also held that membership lists of organiza-
tions need not be revealed.' As Justice Stevens stated in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,"9 whether "[tihe de-
cision in favor of anonymity [is] motivated by fear of economic
or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or
merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as
possible... [it] is an aspect of freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment.""9
People who engage in expressive conduct in public know
they will be observed. But they may choose, like the pamphle-
teer or the petitioner, not to reveal their identity, for all sorts
of reasons. Camera surveillance virtually nullifies that effort.
Because the camera's recorded images are far better than an
informer's memory, it vastly improves government efforts to
link visages with names. Furthermore, as one commentator
points out, "surveillance of a person's movements could, over
plied threat that the fruits of the surveillance may be used for purposes adverse
to the interests of the person being watched. This is calculated to undermine
people's commitment to their own plans and values.").
" Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)(striking down a ban on anon-
ymous handbills, noting that "[plersecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all.")
" Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999) (hold-
ing that Colorado's requirement requiring petition solicitors to wear an identifica-
tion badge "discourages participation in the petition circulation process by forcing
name identification without sufficient cause.').
18 NAACP v. Alabama ex. Rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958X"It is hard-
ly a novel perception that "compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged
in advocacy may constitute [an] effective . . . restraint on freedom of associa-
tion."); see also, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960)(prohibiting compelling
teachers to disclose group memberships).
10 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
19 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42.
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time, reveal associational tendencies as thoroughly as a mem-
bership list."191 These facts can only inhibit the public conduct
of those who want to remain anonymous.
There is little doubt that public camera surveillance can
infringe First Amendment values. When those values are impli-
cated, government should have to justify the presence of the
cameras on a meaningful law enforcement ground; even those
cases that reject First Amendment arguments against camera
surveillance seem to find the existence of a legitimate govern-
ment objective important.'92 Again, however, that conclusion
only provides constitutional protection for expressive conduct, a
category that the Court has defined rather narrowly. Other
caselaw broadens that protection considerably.
2. Freedom of Movement and Repose
Derived from the Due Process Clause, the right to travel is
another fundamental right that might be compromised by pub-
lic camera surveillance. As far back as the turn of the twenti-
eth century, the Supreme Court stated: "Undoubtedly the right
of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and
the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territo-
ry of any state is a right secured by the 14th Amendment and
by other provisions of the Constitution."'93 This sentiment
was echoed over a half century later in Kent v. Dulles,"9 a
case that dealt with restrictions on travel overseas but uses
'9 McAdams, supra note 139, at 322.
' Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. A.T.T., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C.
Cir. 1978)("[Pjhysical surveillance consistent with Fourth Amendment protections
and in connection with a bona fide law enforcement investigation does not violate
First Amendment rights, even though it may be directed at communicative or
associational activities, and even though it may inhibit those activities.")(emphasis
added); see also Grayned v. City of Rockfort, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) ("the right
to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty
reasons"); Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1056
(1985)("Without any reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, the court cannot
conceive of any remotely compelling interest the City has in recording which
political activities an individual chooses to involve herself in..
' Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1909).
"9 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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language relevant to domestic travel as well:
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and
inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel
abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a
livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as
the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of
movement is basic in our scheme of values .... [O]utside
areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to
shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go
where he pleases."9
As this language suggests, the "right of locomotion" is not
limited to expressive actions.' 96 In contrast to the First
Amendment, this right is important for economic and social
reasons as well as political ones. The Kent Court went on the
state explicitly that "[flreedom of movement also has large
social values," including support of activities "close to the core
of personal life [such as] spending hours with old friends.""9
The right to travel was recently reaffirmed as a guarantee
implicit in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9 '
Closely related to the right to freedom of public movement
is the right to repose, or stasis, in public. In Chicago v.
Morales,' a four-member plurality of the Court stated that
the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.... Indeed, it is apparent that an
individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice
is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement
I" Kent, 357 U.S. at 126 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUmA
RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 197 (1956)); see also Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)("our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of
our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden
or restrict this movement.").
19 See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900Xreferring to the right to
move from place to place as the "right of locomotion").
" Kent, 357 U.S. at 126.
19 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-503 (1999).
19 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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inside frontiers that is "a part of our heritage," or the right to
move "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct"
identified in Blackstone's Commentaries.' °
The Court has been emphatic about striking down vagrancy
statutes that trench on this right to repose.2 °'
How might these interests in locomotion and stasis-the
"freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf' 2 -be affected by the panoptic
eye of the camera? Although no courts have directly addressed
this issue, the few that have dealt with analogous facts are
wary of camera use that affects these interests, at least when
there is also proof of some animus. In Goosen v. Walker,' for
instance, a Florida court enjoined the defendant from further
videotaping of his neighbors (with whom he had previously had
altercations), concluding that his videotaping of them in their
yard and adjoining areas, on two to four occasions over a four
month period, constituted "stalking."' In State v. Baumann
et al.," the court upheld an order that permanently enjoined
thirty-two individuals from photographing or videotaping peo-
ple entering and leaving an abortion clinic under circumstances
that exhibited "an intent to harass, intimidate or interfere with
any person seeking access to or departing from such facili-
ty. -"206
200 Morales, 527 U.S. at 53-54 (citations omitted).
201 Id., at 64; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 32 (1983)(invalidating California
statute requiring individuals who loiter or wander the streets to present police
officers with identification upon request); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156 (1972Xinvalidating Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611 (1971)(invalidating Ohio ordinance making it unlawful for three or more
people to assemble in certain public areas in a manner annoying to others).
20 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973XDouglas, J., concurring).
202 714 So.2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1998).
200 Goosen, 714 So.2d at 1150.
No. 92-3198, 1995 WL 78289 (Wis.Ct.App.1995).
20' Baumann, 1995 WL 78289, at *2; see also Pro-Choice Network of Western
New York, 799 F.Supp. 1417, 1437-39 (W.D.N.Y.1992Xcautioning that if defen-
dants continue to use cameras to intimidate women entering abortion clinics, the
court would not hesitate to restrict defendants' use of cameras); Planned Parent-
hood v. Aakhus, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 510, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993 (photographing and
videotaping abortion clinic clients violated the right to privacy under the Califor-
nia Constitution); Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr.
194, 196-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)(upholding an injunction against abortion protest-
260 [VOL. 72
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Even the media, normally left unrestrained by courts con-
cerned about freedom of the press, can go too far. In Wolfson v.
Lewis,"°7 for instance, the court held that "a persistent course
of hounding [by reporters], even if conducted in a public or
semi-public place, may nevertheless rise to the level of invasion
of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion."' It then is-
sued an injunction against investigative news reporters who
had repeatedly sought to videotape and eavesdrop on a busi-
ness executive and his family in and outside their home and
place of work.'
In Goosen the videotaping inhibited repose (in the targets'
backyard), in Baumann it inhibited movement (to and from the
abortion clinic), and in Wolfson it inhibited both (around the
house and workplace and going to and from those locations). In
all three, the videotaping was actionable. That suggests that
public surveillance, even when targeting actions not protected
by the First Amendment, can infringe interests in locomotion
and stasis to a legally cognizable degree.
At the same time, all three courts required proof that those
who wielded the cameras intended to harass. That type of moti-
vation will usually be absent when government watches with
public surveillance cameras. Using the terminology of these
cases, to say that the government's camera surveillance of peo-
ple walking the streets constitutes the malicious-sounding acts
of "stalking," "intimida[tion] or interfere [nce]," or "a persistent
course of hounding" will normally be an exaggeration.
A crucial fact about each of these three cases, however, is
that all of the defendants were raising First Amendment
ers photographing license plates and people entering or leaving an abortion clin-
ic). Although these decisions were based on varying considerations, including, as
in Aakhus, informational privacy, the immediate harm was the unjustifiable inhi-
bition of the plaintiffs' ability to go about their business.
207 924 F.Supp. 1413 (E.D.Pa.1996).
206 Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1420; see also Galella v. Onassis, 533 F.Supp.
1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1982X"under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so
'overzealous' as to render it actionable. It does not strain credulity or imagination
to conceive of the systematic 'public' surveillance of another as being the imple-
mentation of a plan to intrude on the privacy of another")(citing Nader v. General
Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771, 772 (1970)).
20 Wolfson, 924 F.Supp. at 1432-33.
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claims. That is, they were asserting that camera-users, whether
lay or press, have a First Amendment right to videotape public
events,21 an assertion that the courts in these cases accepted.
Given the nature of the right the injunctions would infringe,
the courts had to find a compelling justification for
them-illegitimate harassment. 21 If, on the other hand, public
videotaping were not considered a First Amendment activity,
such proof would not be considered necessary.
The latter observation has significant implications for gov-
ernment-run CCTV. Unlike its citizens, the government does
not have a First Amendment right to train cameras on the
populace. Accordingly, an absence of ill-will on the part of gov-
ernment agents who operate the cameras should not immunize
them from scrutiny. Instead, the issue should be,
straightforwardly, whether government camera surveillance
trenches on the right to movement or repose.
It clearly does, for reasons stated in Part I. People ogled by
cameras may choose to walk rather than run; move on rather
than loiter; even avoid going where they would like to go alto-
gether. While government surveillance may not amount to
intentional stalking or hounding, it is not innocuous. Indeed,
21' See Goosen, 714 So.2d at 1149 (appellant "argues that the injunction is
unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment"); Baumann, 1995 WL
78289, at *4 ("Appellants claim that the 'non-blockading' provisions of the injunc-
tion are 'invalid content-based regulations not narrowly drawn to serve the com-
pelling state interest' and, therefore, violative of rights guaranteed under the
First Amendment."); Wolfson, 924 F.Supp. at 1415 ("Defendants contend that they
did not invade plaintiffs' privacy and that their conduct investigating the salaries
of U.S. Healthcare executives is protected by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.").
.. Goosen, 714 So.2d at 1150 ("While the First Amendment confers on each
citizen a powerful right to express oneself, it gives the [citizen] no boon to jeopar-
dize the health, safety, and rights of others")(alteration in original)(quoting
Bouters v. State, 659 Sol2d 235, 237 (Fla. 1995); Baumann, 1995 WL 78289, at
*7 ("[n]o matter how public the setting or the subject, there is no First Amend-
ment right to use a camera as a tool of intimidation"); Wolfson, 924 F.Supp. at
1433 ("A reasonable jury would likely conclude that it is difficult to understand
how hounding, harassing, and ambushing the Wolfsons would advance the news-
worthy goal of exposing the high salaries paid to U.S. Healthcare executives or
how such conduct would advance the fundamental policies underlying the First
Amendment which include providing information to 'enable members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period.').
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whatever its intent, it can have a similar effect to stalking,
given its inhibition of public locomotion."'
That conclusion does not dictate that such surveillance be
prohibited, of course. It simply requires, again, that the govern-
ment demonstrate a legitimate reason for its actions. As the
Supreme Court has said, "restrictions on the right to travel...
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.""'
3. The Right to Privacy
A third constitutional basis for regulating CCTV comes
from the general right to privacy which is found, depending
upon the decision announcing the right, in the penumbras of
the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, or the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the states.2 4 The Su-
preme Court has relied on this right (which in the caselaw is
often subsumed under a "due process right to liberty") in strik-
ing down laws banning abortion,2"5 interracial marriage,1
purchase and use of contraceptives,2 7 and the like.21 As
212 See William A. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1265, 1277 (1999)(noting that stakeouts "sometimes do in-
volve monitoring the movements of a given suspect . . . over an extended period
of time," which is "roughly the equivalent of being stalked.").
21 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1964)(quoting NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). Aptheker went on to find
unconstitutional the State Department's revocation of passports held by members
of the Communist Party because "[tihe prohibition against travel is supported
only by a tenuous relationship between the bare fact of organizational member-
ship and the activity Congress sought to proscribe." Id. a 514.
214 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLiciEs
785, 790 (2d ed. 2002Xnoting these differing bases for the privacy right).
2" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973X"[The] right to privacy, whether it
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's conception of. personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
21 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)(stating that antimiscegenation
laws "surely ... deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of
law").
21 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)(holding that a law which
prohibited sale of contraceptives to unmarried people was unconstitutional be-
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 263 2002-2003
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
with the rights to freedom of movement and repose, the right to
privacy is not limited to protection of expressive conduct.
There are at least two versions of the right to privacy, one
focusing on protection-of-personhood and the second on free-
dom-from-normalization. The personhood version views the
right to privacy as a means of ensuring individuals are free to
define themselves. It protects against state interference in deci-
sions that are "central to the personal identities of those sin-
gled out."219 The anti-normalization version, in contrast, fo-
cuses on the extent to which the government action standardiz-
es lifestyles.2
The manner in which public camera surveillance affects
our ability to define ourselves has already been suggested, but
a recent article by Andrew Taslitz fleshes out the analysis.
Privacy, Taslitz notes, enables us to present to others only
those parts of our selves that we want them to see."2 That in
turn enables us to put forth different versions of our selves in
different contexts, with those at the job seeing one side, those
at home seeing another, and those at social events or athletic
competitions seeing still another.222 Even in public, we expect
privacy to play its role as a facilitator of self-definition. Taslitz
quotes Michael Riesman's observation that "[pleople may look,
but they are expected to look at those parts that the owner of
the exoself wants them to look at, at appropriate times and
cause, "[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)(holding that a law
which prohibits sale and use of contraceptives infringes "penumbral rights of
privacy and repose").
2.8 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 214, at 768-827.
2"19 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right Of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 752-54 (1989).
Id. at 783-87 & 794 ("The point is not to save for the individual an ab-
stract and chimerical right of defining himself; the point is to prevent the state
from taking over, or taking undue advantage of, those processes by which individ-
uals are defined in order to produce overly standardized, functional citizens.").
" Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 152
(2002).
m Id.
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following certain procedures."' Ogling, staring, or merely
paying more than fleeting attention to strangers in public is
considered impolite and uncivil, because it crosses personal
boundaries and requires revelation of more than we are used to
revealing.' Such conduct prevents us from retaining control
over how we present ourselves.
Thus, Taslitz summarizes, "[wiho looks at us, how, how
long, and for what purposes matter." 5 With respect to cam-
era surveillance in particular, he concludes:
[wihen technology enables the government to stare with an
ever-vigilant and suspicious eye, the boundaries of the self
may partly dissolve, reconstructed in the image chosen by
Leviathan.... Regulation [of this technology] preserves the
idea of a diverse, noisy America, where citizens are free to get
lost in the crowd and where their sense of self stems from
their chosen affiliations and actions rather than from the all-
seeing gaze of the state." 2
As this last statement suggests, because a substantial part of
our personality is developed in public venues, through rituals of
our daily lives that occur outside the home and outside the
family, cameras that stultify public conduct can stifle personali-
ty development. 7
The second version of the right to privacy, championed by
Jed Rubenfeld, pushes toward the same conclusion, but from a
different direction. Rubenfeld debunks the personhood version
of privacy-again, the notion the Court's privacy decisions
should be construed as means of preserving an enclave of
Id. at 169 (quoting Michael Reisman, Law in Brief Encounters 31 (1999)).
SId.
2' Id. at 171.
Id. at 171-72.
Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)(anonymity
.safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to
any concept of liberty"); see generally Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous
Speech: McIntyre and the Internet, 75 ORE. L. REv. 117, 120 (1996)("anonymity is
useful for constituting individual and group identity in interaction."); Robert Post,
The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law of
Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 964 (1989)("An intrusion on privacy is intrinsically
harmful because it is defined as that which injures social personality.").
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decisionmaking (such as abortion or marriage) that allows the
individual to develop one's identity and exercise one's autono-
my. Rather, he argues that these types of cases deal with "the
fundamental freedom not to have one's life too totally deter-
mined by a progressively more normalizing state."' A prohi-
bition on abortion and use of contraceptives is unconstitutional,
he says, not because decisions about those issues are necessary
to self-definition, but because together they force women to be
mothers;' a prohibition on interracial marriages is unconsti-
tutional not because it infringes one's autonomy to do what one
wants, but because it coerces people into having homogenous
children. s The "danger" of such laws, Rubenfeld states,
is a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed
occupation of individuals' lives. That is the danger. of which
Foucault as well as the right to privacy is warning us: a soci-
ety standardized and normalized, in which lives are too sub-
stantially or too rigidly directed. That is the threat posed by
state power in our century."s
Note in particular Rubenfeld's use of Foucault. Here
Rubenfeld is referring to the same Foucaultian concerns identi-
fied earlier in this article about the modern state's ability,
"through expanded technologies and far more systematic meth-
ods of acculturation,... to watch over and shape our lives, to
dispose and predispose us, and to inscribe into our lives and
consciousnesses its particular designs." 2 Although Rubenfeld
does not speak of government surveillance directly, his argu-
ment that the right to privacy has been and should be ranged
against government actions that promote "normalization" has
significant implications for that particular type of state action.
As Simon Davies commented in describing the effect of CCTV
and other forms of technological surveillance, "[tihe society we
are developing now... is a Brave New World dominated not so
much by tyranny as by a deadening political and cultural phe-
' Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 784.
2" Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 788-91.
230 Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 791-92.
21 Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 784.
2'2 Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 775.
[VOL. 72
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 266 2002-2003
PUBLIC PRIVACY
nomenon that Ralph Nader calls 'harmony ideology' [the com-
ing together of opposing ideologies and beliefs into manufac-
tured consensus]." 3 If CCTV contributes to that effect-and
the literature linking panopticism and anticipatory conformity
suggests it does2 -it impinges directly on the privacy right
that Rubenfeld believes the Court's decisions establish, and
should be regulated accordingly.
4. Freedom from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
None of these arguments about a constitutional basis for
regulating government camera surveillance rely directly on the
Fourth Amendment. Surely if CCTV implicates the First
Amendment, the due process rights to movement and repose, or
the general right to privacy, it ought to implicate the Fourth
Amendment as well. Yet the Supreme Court's caselaw constru-
ing the scope of that amendment leaves little purchase for such
a position.
In Katz v. United States, 5 the seminal decision defining
the threshold of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
held that government agents who bugged a phone booth had
engaged in a Fourth Amendment search. 6 Even though pre-
vious cases had held that the Fourth Amendment is not impli-
cated unless a trespass occurs on a "constitutionally protected
area" (i.e., a house, person, paper or effect), 7 and even
though the bugging in this case involved neither a trespass or a
protected area, the Court reasoned that "what a person seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
' Davies, supra note 38, at 144 & n.1.
24 See supra text accompanying notes 131-137.
2'" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2'3 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
2.1 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961)(stating that
its holding that use of a spike mike inserted in defendant's wall is a search was
"based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928)(in holding that wire-
tapping is not a search, stating that "[tihe evidence was secured by the use of
the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of
the defendants.").
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may be constitutionally protected."238
The majority opinion also stated, however, that "what a
person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protections."29 This is the sentiment up-
on which the Court relied in Knotts when it held that use of a
beeper to monitor movement on the public highway is not a
search." As the lower court caselaw previously surveyed in-
dicated, application of this formulation to CCTV is likely to
produce the same result."' One could perhaps argue that one
did not "know" certain public conduct was exposed to the cam-
era, but that strategy is unlikely to work under most circum-
stances. First, we are talking about overt, not covert, camera
use, accompanied by signs announcing its presence. Second, the
Court has indicated that government need not show actual
knowledge of exposure to nullify Fourth Amendment protection.
If a target should have known public exposure might occur, the
Court has held, one assumes the risk of such exposure and
loses Fourth Amendment protection.
2
That's not all. Time and again, the Court has emphasized
the distinction between mere observation and physical intru-
sion." Thus, police observation from a public vantage point
is not a search, even if the area observed is the curtilage, tradi-
238 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
23 Id.
' United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983)("A police car following
Petschen at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving
the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with the
drum of chloroform still in the car.").
2 See supra note 106.
' Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)(holding that police did not
carry out a search when they obtained phone numbers dialed by Smith from
phone company because, by dialing the numbers, Smith "assumed the risk that
the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.").
so See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000Xin holding that
feeling soft luggage was a search, Court stated "[p]hysically invasive inspection is
simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection"); Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S. 476
U.S. 227, 237 (1986Xin holding that EPA photography of a chemical plant's curti-
lage from a plane was not a search, stating that "[any actual physical entry by
EPA into any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions"); Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S 207, 213 (1986)(in holding that looking into a backyard
from an airplane is not a search, stating "[t]he observations took place within
public navigable airspace ... in a physically nonintrusive manner").
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tionally considered to be part of the home.2' Indeed, even if
the target is the home itself, the degree of physical intrusion
plays an important role. In the Court's recent decision in Kyllo
v. United States,2" the Court held that use of a thermal
imager to detect heat sources inside a house is a search, wheth-
er or not the government agent using the imager is on public
property.2" However, in dictum the Court exempted from
Fourth Amendment protection naked eye surveillance of the
home that does not require "physical intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area," as well as any technological surveil-
lance that merely replicates what such naked eye viewing
would observe. 7 To the extent CCTV merely replicates what
naked observation from a public vantage point could view, it is
unlikely to merit Fourth Amendment protection apparently
even when it allows viewing of the interior of the home.
Similarly, despite CCTV's inhibition of the right to move-
ment, it is unlikely to amount to a Fourth Amendment "sei-
zure" under the Court's cases. Such a seizure occurs when the
government, "by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,"2' or at
least when "a reasonable person [would not be] at liberty to
ignore the police presence and go about his business."2" Al-
though the latter formulation could in theory contemplate the
effects of CCTV, which may well retard people's ability to go
about their business, the Court has twice held that police do
' See Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 236-37 (upholding aerial surveillance of busi-
ness curtilage); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (noting that not all police observation of
the area within curtilage is disallowed).
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
'7 Id. ("Where . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search."). I have pointed out that
this language could be read to mean "that if the activity observed could be seen
with the naked eye without physical intrusion into the constitutionally protected
areas of home or curtilage, then police may exploit any technology-generally used
or not-without implicating the Fourth Amendment." Christopher Slobogin, Peeping
Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1393, 1419 (2002).
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n. 16 (1968).
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988).
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not effect a seizure if they conspicuously follow or chase an
individual without bringing the individual to a stop.' Under
this caselaw, it would be difficult to argue that monitoring an
individual with a camera is a seizure.
But what about the fact that CCTV allows recording of
one's public activity? It has been argued that even if we as-
sume the risk that others will view our public conduct, we do
not assume the risk that our public actions will be reduced to a
photograph or film that can be "scrutinized indefinitely and
disseminated to an unintended audience" and that "allows the
viewer to discern details that would not have been apparent to
a casual observer.""1 This argument too is plausible, but once
again the Court's cases are very unhelpful as support. In On
Lee v. United States, 252 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the government
overhears and records an individual's conversation with an
informer through a body bug worn by the informer,253 a hold-
ing it later affirmed.' If we have to assume the risk that our
acquaintances are secretly recording our conversations, we
probably also have to assume the risk that overt CCTV will be
recording our public conduct.
There are at least three lines of attack against this view of
the Fourth Amendment's (non) application to CCTV. The first,
of course, is to show that the Court's public exposure/assump-
tion of risk approach to the Fourth Amendment is misguided.
That approach has already produced intriguing scholarship
(which the Court unfortunately has ignored),255 and no such
' See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574 (holding police car driving alongside defen-
dant not a seizure); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991)(police chase of
defendant not a seizure).
" Sire, supra note 140, at 470-71; see also, Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Pri-
vacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public
Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1041-44 (1995).
2m2 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
On Lee, 343 U.S. at 753 (the defendant "was talking confidentially and
indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was overheard .... due to aid from a
transmitter and receiver, to be sure, but with the same effect on his privacy as if
agent Lee had been eavesdropping outside an open window.").
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751 (1994)
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effort will be made in this article. The second method of under-
mining the apparent judicial acquiescence to unregulated pub-
lic surveillance is to accept the Court's formulation of the
Fourth Amendment's threshold, but to distinguish its caselaw
by insisting, for instance, that CCTV does effectuate a "seizure"
because of its effect on movement, or that it does constitute a
"search" when it creates a record because that is not a risk we
assume when we go out in public. The likely futility of this line
of argument has already been suggested, and in any event will
not be pursued here.2 6
The third line of attack, which I do undertake here, is to
take seriously the Court's admonition that the Fourth
Amendment's scope is ultimately defined by "expectations of
privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." This
language, first found in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Katz"57 and since elevated to litmus test status (superceding
even the "knowing exposure" language)," suggests an empir-
ical inquiry into society's views about privacy. If the Court real-
ly means to equate Fourth Amendment protections with the
expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable, it should not ignore society's views on that topic.
The next section briefly describes one effort at such an inquiry,
which resulted in findings that support the Fourth
Amendment's application to CCTV.
(arguing that inculcation of trust between citizens and government, not privacy,
should be the core interest protected by the Fourth Amendment); William J.
Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1016 (1995) (arguing that coercion, not privacy, should be the principal focus of
Fourth Amendment protection); Tom Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307 (1998) (ar-
guing that the Fourth Amendment protects security); see also R. v. Duarte, 1
S.C.R. 30, paras. 25, 26 (1990), where the Canadian Supreme Court held that
reasonable expectations of privacy are to be defined by standards of privacy that
persons can expect to enjoy in a "free society," not by assumption of risk analysis.
But see supra text accompanying note 109.
"' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 384 (3d ed. 2002)("[L]ower courts attempting to interpret and apply
Katz quickly came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration as ultimately did a majori-
ty of the Supreme Court.*).
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C. An Empirically-Based Case for Fourth Amendment
Regulation of CCTV
Basing Fourth Amendment protection on society's expecta-
tions of privacy requires answering several questions. First,
how can we discover these expectations? Second, what are
they? Third, in what sense are they relevant to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis?
1. Sources of Society's Privacy Expectations Vis-a-vis CCTV
How does one determine society's views about whether
CCTV threatens privacy? One source is the positive law govern-
ing public camera surveillance by entities other than the gov-
ernment. If such surveillance is a crime or a tort, then it might
be said to infringe on expectations of privacy considered impor-
tant by society.
At first glance, both case law and statutory law appear to
indicate quite the opposite. As noted previously,259 the court
decisions that address overt videotaping of public activity by
private actors generally require a significant degree of mali-
ciousness before relief will be granted.2" Statutory law re-
garding public camera use is also sparse. Recall that only Ari-
zona has a statute specifically dealing with public videotaping
by private parties," in contrast to the many states that pro-
hibit or significantly limit use of cameras to capture activities
within the home.262
" See supra text accompanying. notes 203-10.
21 See also, William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 391-92 (1960)
(asserting that the tort of privacy invasion is not implicated when one takes a
photograph of a person in a public place, "since this amounts to nothing more
than making a record, not differing essentially from a full written description, of
a public sight which any one present would be free to see"); Sheldon Halpern,
The Traffic in Souls: Privacy Interests and the Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Sys-
tems, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 45, 59-60 (1995)(noting
that "to the limited extent that . .. observation per se, absent publication...
has been deemed actionable, it has been surreptitious and offensively intrusive").
' See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 104; see also State Hidden Camera Stat-
utes at httpJ/www.rcfp.org/handbook (listing eleven other states that "expressly
prohibit the unauthorized installation or use of cameras in private places.").
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This paucity of positive law regulating public camera use
probably says little about society's attitudes toward CCTV,
however. That is because there is no real private analogue to
government-run CCTV. No entity other than the government
engages in concerted, overt surveillance of the public streets
using cameras. If private companies or individuals began film-
ing public spaces twenty-four hours a day using zoom and
nightvision capacity in an effort to discern, say, people's shop-
ping, exercise, eating and drinking patterns, both tort and
statutory regulation would probably be forthcoming.'
A second source of information about society's views con-
cerning the intrusiveness of CCTV comes from polls directly
asking about attitudes toward CCTV. Although to date there
are few polls of that type in the United States,2" researchers
in the United Kingdom have conducted several. All of them
show significant public support for CCTV, well-above 60%.2"
Yet the most sophisticated poll of this type also indicated some
concern about the practice, despite its prevalence in that coun-
try. More than 50% of the respondents felt that some entity
other than the government or private security firms should be
responsible for the installation of CCTV in public places, 72%
agreed that "these cameras could easily be abused and used by
" Somewhat analogous to such regulation is the federal government's effort to
limit private companies' accumulation of data about habits and personal charac-
teristics from credit reports, government records, driver's licenses, video rentals,
student records, health records, children's Internet activities, and banking, insur-
ance, and investment company records. Although these statutory efforts at regula-
tion are not particularly effective, they represent a desire to restrict the extent to
which private entities can obtain information that we have disclosed to people
outside our immediate circle and that sometimes are even a matter of "public
record." See generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases
and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1440-44 (2001)
(describing the legislation and its flaws).
2" A Harris poll conducted in the United States in October, 2002, did indicate
that 63% of those surveyed were in favor of "increased video surveillance" of
public places like airports. Ken Kaye, High Tech Security Gets Tests at Airports,
Fr. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 20, 2002, at Al.
2 See Taylor, supra note 48, 1 16 (reporting polling results that found be-
tween 69 and 95% in favor of the cameras). But see supra note 144, describing a
study leading the author to question the higher figures on the ground that those
surveyed were usually plied with positive statements about CCTV beforehand.
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the wrong people," 39% believed that the people in control of
these systems could not be "completely trusted to use them
only for the public good," and 37% felt that "in the future, cam-
eras will be used by the government to control people."'
More than 10% of the respondents believed that CCTV cameras
should be banned. 7 Americans, who tend to be more con-
cerned about government power than the British, would proba-
bly be even more hostile to CCTV.
More importantly, poll results showing favorable attitudes
toward CCTV fail to distill feelings about intrusiveness from
feelings about security. Those who say they do not mind gov-
ernment camera surveillance may be allowing its perceived
effectiveness at preventing crime to submerge their discomfort
about being watched. That attitude makes sense; indeed, if the
threat of harm to be prevented is high, a wide range of people
will welcome policing techniques much more intrusive than
camera surveillance, as reactions to the events of September 11
have shown.' Under the Fourth Amendment, however, that
type of balancing/reasonableness calculus is not supposed to
inform the initial question of whether something is a search or
seizure, but rather only whether something that is a search or
seizure is justified.269
To isolate the intrusiveness question more cleanly with
respect to CCTV, I used a methodology that Joseph
Schumacher and I developed in a previous study about the
Fourth Amendment's threshold.27 ° In that study we asked
people how they rated the intrusiveness of a number of police
2" Davies, supra note 38, at 152 (describing a British Home Office survey
conducted in 1992).
267 Id.
"' See supra note 95.
269 See Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of
the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1053, 1072 (1998)(asserting
that using balancing analysis to define search or seizure "is barred by the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment itself. That provision's prohibition on 'unreason-
able searches and seizures' applies the reasonableness test only after something
has been labeled a search or seizure.').
270 Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Un-
derstandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE L. J. 727 (1993).
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investigative techniques. That approach permits a better as-
sessment of how people feel about the effect each technique has
on privacy, because it produces a hierarchy of perceived intru-
siveness; even people who are willing to sacrifice most or all of
their privacy interests to fight crime evaluate the privacy-in-
vading impact of different crime fighting techniques differently.
Thus, for instance, on average our subjects rated a body cavity
search as the most intrusive of the scenarios and a search of a
public park as the least, and a search of a bedroom as more
intrusive than a frisk.2 7' From these types of results, one can
draw useful conclusions about the relative magnitude of
people's expectations of privacy with respect to a given tech-
nique such as CCTV.
Unfortunately, the fifty scenarios in the Slobogin &
Schumacher study did not include any involving camera sur-
veillance. The study reported here fills that gap.
2. The Study
The survey form developed for this study was similar to
the form used in the original Slobogin and Schumacher study
with a few notable exceptions. First, it contained only twenty
relevant scenarios,2 72 not fifty. Second, it included two or
three scenarios (depending upon which of three survey versions
the subject received) describing various forms of camera sur-
veillance. The three basic camera surveillance scenarios were
police use of cameras with zoom capacity at national monu-
ments, police use of cameras with zoom capacity at airports
and other transportation centers, and police use of cameras
with zoom capacity at 300-yard intervals along a public street.
The latter scenario had two variations: overt versus hidden
cameras, and destruction of records within 96 hours versus
indeterminate retention of records which could be released to
government agencies and the media as needed. Also new with
this survey form were scenarios involving other types of techno-
271 Id. at 738-39 (Table 1).
272 The survey actually contained twenty-five scenarios but the results pertain-
ing to several of them (involving, e.g., searches of personal diaries and car
trunks) do not add appreciably to the discussion and are not reported here.
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logical surveillance (i.e., beepers and "see-through" devices27 )
and a scenario describing a police officer following an individu-
al on the public street.274
The survey was completed by 190 people called for jury
duty in Gainesville, Florida. Because Florida jury pools are
randomly selected from voter registration lists, this sample was
a relatively diverse group of people. As in the earlier study,
2 75
the subjects were told to assume that, in each scenario, the
police were looking for evidence of crime but that the target of
the police action had not engaged in any criminal activity. In
other words, the subjects were told to assume the individuals
in the scenarios were innocent, an assumption that is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's definition of "search" and "sei-
zure" for Fourth Amendment purposes.276 Then, as in the ear-
lier study,27 7 the subjects were told to rate each scenario in
terms of "intrusiveness" on a scale of 1 to 100, with 1 repre-
senting "not intrusive" and 100 representing "very intrusive."
Using these ratings, an average intrusiveness rating for
each scenario was calculated, along with the standard deviation
so that the statistical significance of any differences between
averages could be computed. As with the previous study, sever-
al such differences resulted. Table 1 reports the mean intru-
2781ih hi
siveness rating of the twenty scenarios, together with their
"' See supra note 47 and accompanying text
'4 The survey forms are on fie with the author and the Mississippi Law
Journal.
Slobogin & Shumacher, supra note 270, at 736.
27 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)("the 'reasonable
person' test presupposes an innocent person"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519
n.4 (1983)(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The fact that [respondent] knew the search
was likely to turn up contraband is of course irrelevant; the potential intrusive-
ness of the officers' conduct must be judged from the viewpoint of an innocent
person in [his] position").
'" Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 270, at 736.
.78 Some of the scenarios in this study that were very similar to those used in
the previous one received significantly different means. For example, the coal
mine inspection scenario yielded a mean of 25 in this study versus a mean of 52
in the previous one; the patdown scenario a mean of 68 in this study and of 55
in the previous one; the border body cavity search scenario a mean of 75 in this
study and of 90 in the previous one. Comparisons are problematic, however, be-
cause the previous study incorporated many variations that were not present in
this study. See id. at 733-36. Also, the patdown scenario in the present study
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confidence intervals (a figure which, when added to or subtract-
ed from the mean, indicates the extent to which a given differ-
ence between means is statistically significant27 9 ). The follow-
ing discussion will focus on those findings most relevant to
understanding what the subjects thought about camera surveil-
lance.
Scenario
TABLE 1
Mean Intrusiveness Ratings of Twenty Scenarios
Mean Confidence
Interval
1. Looking in foliage in park
2. Heath & safety inspection of factory
3. Monitoring cameras at national monuments
4. Monitoring cameras at government
buildings, airports, train stations
5. Inspection of a coal mine
6. Monitoring cameras at convenience
and retail stores
7. Stopping drivers at roadblock for 15 seconds
8. Monitoring covert street cameras with
zoom capacity
9. Flying helicopter 400 feet over backyard
10. Police officer noticeably following
person down street
11. Going through garbage cans at curbside
12. Search of a junkyard
13. Monitoring overt street cameras;
tapes destroyed after 96 hours
14. Monitoring a beeper on a car for three days
15. Use of device that can see through
clothing to detect outline of items
16. A patdown of outer clothing, feeling for weapons
17. Use of a video camera to overhear
a conversation on the street
18. Same as 13, but tapes not destroyed
19. Body cavity search at border
20. Search of bedroom
20 ±7
25 ±5
26 ±8
35 ±5
42 ±9
50 ±5
53 ±8
63 ±5
67 ±5
68 ±5
stated that the officer "was feeling for weapons," whereas the previous study
merely stated he patted down the outer clothing. Nonetheless, with the exception
of the first two examples given, the hierarchy produced by the two studies is very
similar.
r' For explication, see id. at 745 n.67. The confidence intervals are larger for
the camera surveillance scenarios because, given the desire to test variations of
those scenarios, there were fewer surveys completed for each.
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The most important finding of the study for purposes of
this article was the relative rating of the scenario involving
cameras overtly positioned at 300-yard intervals along the
street. As can be seen from Table 1, that scenario (#13) re-
ceived an average intrusiveness rating of 53 (M=53). This rat-
ing was significantly lower (as a statistical matter) than the
ratings for bedroom searches (M=76), body cavity searches
(M=75) and electronic eavesdropping on conversations in public
(M=70), which require probable cause,' 0 and also significant-
ly lower than the rating for either a traditional (M=68) or elec-
tronic frisk (M=67), which require reasonable suspicion."1 At
the same time, it was significantly higher than the average
intrusiveness ratings for a health and safety inspection of a
factory (M=14), an inspection of a coal mine (M=25), and a 15-
second stop at a roadblock (M=35), all government actions that
the Supreme Court has declared are governed by the Fourth
Amendment."
" Searches of bedrooms and eavesdropping on "private" conversations carried
out in public clearly require probable cause. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
768 (1969)(holding non-exigent search of bedroom requires warrant); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (holding warrantless bugging of phone
booth conversation unconstitutional because even though "booth is 'accessible to
the public' at other times, . . . it is a temporarily private place whose momentary
occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.").
Although the Supreme Court has avoided addressing the Fourth Amendment
implications of body cavity searches, U.S. v. Montoya-Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
541 n.3 (1985), other courts have long required probable cause for such searches
even when conducted at the border. See, e.g., Blackford v. U.S., 247 F.2d 745, 753
(9th Cir. 1957)(body cavity search at border permissible upon probable
cause-"precise knowledge of what, and how much was where"-if conducted reason-
ably).
281 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)(holding patdown requires reasonable
suspicion). The legality of electronic frisks has yet to be taken up directly, but
because they reveal items underneath one's clothing, they presumably would re-
quire at least reasonable suspicion. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 82-96
(discussing standards regulating "detection devices").
'" Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)(requiring that inspection pro-
grams for coal mines provide "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a war-
rant); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978Xrequiring administrative
warrant for nonconsensual factory inspections); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556
(1976)("It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 'seizures' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."). Note also that the public camera surveillance rating was
similar to the rating received for the scenario involving the junkyard search,
which is also governed by the Fourth Amendment. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
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The intrusiveness ratings for the other scenarios involving
cameras fell within the range demarcated by the latter three
scenarios, with one exception. While camera surveillance of na-
tional monuments (M=20), transportation centers (M=20) and
stores (M=26) received relatively low intrusiveness ratings, co-
vert camera surveillance of the public streets (M=42) received a
significantly higher rating. At the same time, that rating is
significantly lower than the rating for overt camera surveil-
lance. Apparently, as suggested throughout this article, knowl-
edge that cameras are present triggers a greater feeling of
intrusion than knowledge that cameras might be present.
Also of note are the intrusiveness ratings of three govern-
ment actions the Court has declared are not searches: helicop-
ter overflights 400 feet above the backyard (M=50), being fol-
lowed by a police officer (M=50), and curbside searches of gar-
bage (M=51).' These three scenarios were perceived to be as
intrusive, statistically speaking, as public camera surveillance,
and significantly more intrusive than the administrative in-
spections and the roadblock.
Should these three findings call into question the Court's
determinations that administrative inspections and roadblocks
are Fourth Amendment events, or instead lead us to question
the holdings that helicopter overflights, garbage scavenging
and police tailing (and, by implication, public camera surveil-
lance) are not? Consistent with the thesis of this article, I be-
lieve we should be more concerned about the second conclusion.
While, as noted earlier,' the Court seems to place all police
actions that are not physically invasive and that occur outside
the home outside the Fourth Amendment as well, the subjects
were apparently more attuned to the offensive nature of gov-
ernment helicopters hovering over one's yard, agents going
through one's intimate, albeit abandoned, items, and officers
stalking citizens. At the same time, the lower ratings the sur-
691 (1987Xapplying Dewey to inspections of junkyards for stolen auto parts).
283 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)(helicopter 400 feet above backyard);
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35 (1988Xsearching garbage separated from other garbage).
28 See supra text accompanying notes 243-47.
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vey participants assigned to business safety inspections and
brief car detentions are not inconsistent with the view that the
Fourth Amendment is implicated by these actions, as they are
still significantly higher than searching through foliage in a
public (M=8). Put simply, the participants are better than the
Court at identifying expectations of privacy society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.
3. The Relevance of Empirical Findings
As Professor Schumacher and I noted in connection with
the previous study, there are several potential methodological
problems with this kind of survey. 5 These "internal validity"
and sampling issues will not be rehearsed here. It suffices to
say that, despite some reservations, we concluded in the earlier
work that this type of survey "accurately measured how people
rank the intrusiveness of various search and seizures." 6
Assuming the same conclusion can be reached about the
present study, it is still important to revisit one central issue:
Why should we care, for constitutional purposes, what ordinary
people think about the intrusiveness of various police actions?
One easy answer is the one already given: the Court has told
us society's views are relevant by defining the Fourth Amend-
ment in terms of "expectations of privacy society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable."27
But perhaps this language should not be interpreted liter-
ally. There are a number of reasons why it may be a bad idea
to do so. These reasons are all complicated, and will only be
briefly described here. I will respond to these objections in an
equally brief, and I have to admit, incomplete fashion.
One reason to avoid a literal reading of Katz is the vari-
ability and manipulability of public attitudes. As many com-
mentators have pointed out,' technology and modern social
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 270, at 743-51.
28 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 270, at 744.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g, Sundby, supra note 255, at 23 (stating the "overall decline in the
Amendment's protections ... will only worsen as the inevitable march of govern-
ment regulation further blurs the notion of what is private and as technological
advances enable the government to invade privacy in more pervasive, but physi-
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practices are rapidly reducing everyone's privacy and
everyone's expectations thereof, with the result that a literal
construction of Katz would produce an ever-shrinking Fourth
Amendment. Resort to empirical data about society's attitudes
in defining the Fourth Amendment's scope would probably only
accelerate that trend, and destabilize search and seizure law at
the same time.
Research such as that described here, however, only pro-
vides information about relative intrusiveness in society's eyes.
It does not tell the Court where to position the Fourth Amend-
ment threshold. The decision as to what level of privacy expec-
tations is accorded constitutional protection can still be a judi-
cial, normative one that has precedential impact. Nor are
society's views likely to change once the Court sets the Fourth
Amendment threshold, because the Court's pronouncement will
reinforce those views. If, however, those views nonetheless
change substantially-for instance, if twenty years from now,
government-run CCTV is seen as much less intrusive than
searching foliage in a public park, or much more intrusive than
a frisk-then Fourth Amendment analysis should probably
change with them. After all, that is what happened when Katz
declared that non-trespassory electronic surveillance is a
search after forty years of precedent saying otherwise. 9
cally less intrusive, ways."); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the
Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN. DIEGO L. REv. 843 (2002)(pointing out that the "em-
bedded imprecision" of the privacy concept and the incremental "internalization" of
new privacy norms dictated by technological and other innovations operate togeth-
er to erode privacy boundaries); Duarte v. R., 1 S.C.R. 30, para 24 (1990X"The
very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the potential, if left
unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our communications will remain
private.").
28 Monahan and Walker argue that methodologically sound research that is
relevant to a given legal issue should not only be considered by the courts, but
should operate as "social authority," just as caselaw and statutes are considered
legal authority. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 488
(1986). On that assumption, if the relevant social science changes, the law based
on it should change as well.
Like legal precedent, research findings can become outdated as circum-
stances change. A survey of the kinds of films that members of a commu-
nity found "patently offensive" in the 1950's, for example, might have
2002]
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A second objection to a literal interpretation of Katz's ex-
pectation of privacy language is that, at the margins, it might
render nugatory the language and history of the Fourth
Amendment. Consider CCTV as an example. One could argue,
as suggested earlier, 2 ° that regardless of its relative intru-
siveness according to the community, CCTV does not constitute
either a "search" or a "seizure" of "persons, papers, houses and
effects" as those terms are normally understood. One could also
plausibly contend that it is not the type of government activity
that even remotely concerned the framers. Yet, as developed
further in Part IV,291 close scrutiny of a person, whether in
public or private, can easily be called a "search." And while it is
true that physical searches, particularly of homes, were the
main concern of the framers, surveillance of the streets by
British soldiers was a major irritant for the colonists. 2 Ulti-
little value in the context of an obscenity prosecution in the 1980's. A
third way, therefore, that courts could evaluate a piece of social science
research would be to gauge the extent to which the people and situations
studied in the research resemble those involved in the controversy at
issue, and the extent to which the passage of time may have attenuated
the findings.
Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
2 See supra text accompanying notes 239-253.
291 See infra text accompanying notes 421-422.
Anonymous Account of the Boston Massacre, at http//odur.let.rug.nI/-usa/D/
1751-1775boston-/anon.htm (stating that "the challenging of the inhabitants by
sentinels posted in all parts of town . . . occasioned many quarrels and uneasi-
ness"); see also Westin, supra note 115, at 57-58 (noting that "[tihe whole network
of American constitutional rights . . . was established to curtail the ancient sur-
veillance claims of governmental authorities.'); Don B. Kates, The Second
Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 103
(1992)(stating that, for the Founders, "the very idea of empowering government to
place an armed force in constant watch over the populace was vehemently reject-
ed as a paradigm of abhorrent French despotism," and noting that organized
police forces were resisted in colonial times). In correspondence with the author,
Professor Davies, who has closely studied the Fourth Amendment's history, em-
phasized the last fact, noting that, other than "snooping" by British informers
(which occasioned hostility among the colonists), there was no one available to
conduct surveillance: "the constable had better things to do (trying to make a liv-
ing) than stand around looking for hints of crime." E-mail from Thomas Davies,
Professor of Law, University of Tennessee School of Law, to Christopher Slobogin,
Professor of Law, the University of Florida School of Law (July 8, 2002, 2:16 PM
CST)(on file with author). Davies also noted the lack of surveillance technology in
colonial times and pointed out that "surveillers would have had more difficulty
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mately, however, the strength of this second objection depends
upon how important "plain meaning" and original intent are to
Fourth Amendment analysis and upon what these phrases
mean, topics well beyond the scope of this article. 3
A related and final objection to taking Katz literally is that
courts should consider only these latter types of factors because
courts are, by tradition if not by definition, nonmajoritarian
institutions. While some constitutional issues-the definition of
obscenity comes to mind 2 -are largely determined by commu-
nity views, most such issues-compulsion for Fifth Amendment
purposes," speech under the First Amendment," probable
cause for Fourth Amendment purposes' 7-are not."8 At the
least, shouldn't the courts ignore community norms that are
inconsistent with principles derived from other sources when
determining the scope of core constitutional concepts?
This question is also huge and difficult, and the answer
depends much upon context.' A recent article by Robert
blending into the smaller, closer social settings of that time.' Id.
'2 See generally David Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and the Common
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1734 (2000):
[A]nchoring the Fourth Amendment in common law will do little to make
it more principled or predictable, in part because common-law limits on
searches and seizures were thinner, vaguer, and far more varied than the
Court seems to suppose. What the common law has of value to offer
Fourth Amendment law is what it has to offer constitutional law more
generally: not its rules but its method.").
Id. at 1734.
' Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)(whether a work appeals to the
"prurient interest" is to be defined by "community standards"); see also Atkins v.
Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2244 (2002)(ruling that the definition of cruel and un-
usual punishment under Eighth Amendment is dependent upon consensus of pub-
lic, judges, legislators and scholars).
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Cf West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)("One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, free-
dom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.').
" I have argued, for instance, that public opinion is of very limited relevance
in designing provisions of the substantive criminal law. Christopher Slobogin, Is
Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J.
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Post, a noted scholar on privacy issues, provides the beginning
of a response, a response pertinent to the other two objections
as well. Post describes three possible "concepts of privacy":
privacy as the control of knowledge; privacy as a protector of
dignity; and privacy as a means of implementing freedom."°
The first concept, he argues, does not really raise a privacy
question at all, because it has more to do with disclosure of
information rather than with intrusion, and the third he sees
as "an argument for liberal limitations on government" such as
those imposed by cases like Roe v. Wade."'1 The form of priva-
cy he views as most relevant to Fourth Amendment issues is
privacy as dignity, which grounds privacy "in social forms of re-
spect that we owe each other as members of a common com-
munity,""0 2 and "locates privacy in precisely the aspects of so-
cial life that are shared and mutual."3°s He asserts that, when
privacy "is understood as a form of dignity, there can ultimate-
ly be no other measure of privacy than the social norms that
actually exist in our civilization."3°4 If that is so, then Fourth
Amendment privacy depends upon measurements of societal
norms regarding privacy expectations, which is what the sur-
veys described above attempt to measure.
There is also an institutional reason to align Fourth
Amendment expectations of privacy with society's views on the
matter. As stated in the article describing the first study,
"[alssuming valid data showing that the community and the
Court think differently, the Court's continued adherence to its
own views, through what has aptly been called normative con-
stitutional fact-finding, would further strain its credibility." 5
Ultimately, ignoring such data and the community views it
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 315 (1996).
'o Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001).
50 Id. at 2087, 2087-92, 2096-98.
3m Id. at 2092.
Id. at 2094.
I' d.
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 270, at 753 (footnote omittedXrelying
on David L. Faigman, 'Normative Constitutional Fact-finding": Exploring the Em-
pirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 581-88
(1991)).
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represents "undermines the Court's legitimacy.""°
D. Summary
A good case can be made for the conclusion that overt
CCTV operated by the government in public spaces ought to be
subject to constitutional regulation. The source of such regu-
lation could be the First Amendment, the right to travel found
in the Due Process Clause, the general right to privacy, or the
Fourth Amendment. CCTV can intimidate those engaging in
political expression, inhibit public movement and repose, affect
one's public personality, accelerate normalization and, if the
empirical study reported here is any indication, be as intrusive
as police actions which the Supreme Court has said implicate
the Fourth Amendment. Although the interests infringed by
CCTV are somewhat disparate, they can all be subsumed under
the umbrella interest in public anonymity-the right to be free
of intensive government scrutiny even in public, absent suspi-
cious conduct.8"
Of the various constitutional bases that could implement
this right to anonymity, I prefer the Fourth Amendment, for
two related reasons. First, it is the amendment that tradition-
ally has been applied to police investigation techniques, and
CCTV is such a technique. The Court has suggested that when
two or more constitutional provisions are implicated, the one
most directly implicated should apply."°  Second, Fourth
Amendment analysis provides a better framework for regulat-
ing CCTV than the other constitutional doctrines. If a govern-
30 Id.
' Note, however, one difference between a right to anonymity and the other
rights. Each of the other rights could be said to be inhibited by crime at least as
much as by cameras (consider in particular the right to movement and repose).
Thus, one could argue they are infringed if government does not install CCTV, at
least in high crime areas. See infra Part IIIA. The right to anonymity is more
clearly independent of the fear of crime; it is always implicated by CCTV.
' Albright v. Oliver, 5120 U.S. 266, 273 (1994X"[W]here a particular amend-
ment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a
particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more general-
ized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these
claims'" (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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ment action infringes the First Amendment, the Due Process
Clause, or the general right to privacy, its permissibility de-
pends upon whether the government has a "compelling" or
"substantial" interest in pursuing the action, concepts that are
very ill-defined."° Depending upon the interest involved, the
action's legitimacy may also depend on how "necessary" it is to
accomplish that interest, again a nebulously defined inqui-
rys10 Although essentially the same analysis occurs under the
Fourth Amendment, its greater flexibility and its better-devel-
oped substantive and procedural rules provide a more concrete
regulatory template, as Part III demonstrates.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC ANONYMITY
I propose that constitutional regulation of government
efforts to pierce public anonymity through CCTV consist of four
components. First, law enforcement should have to justify both
the establishment of a particular camera system and its use to
scrutinize particular individuals. Second, it should have to
develop policies regarding the procedure for conducting camera
surveillance. Third, it should have to develop policies regarding
storage and dissemination of recorded materials to other enti-
ties. Finally, and most importantly, it should be accountable to
entities outside law enforcement when it fails to follow these
three requirements.
Even this barebones description of the regulatory scheme
sounds decidedly legislative in nature, and therefore arguably
something the judiciary is not equipped to fashion. But, as the
following discussion will make clear, the judicial objective
should be merely to establish the regulatory framework, law
enforcement agencies and the political process can fill in the
details. Erik Luna has described the phenomenon of "constitu-
tional roadmapping," in which the courts, in striking down
governmental laws or censoring conduct of government agents,
suggest constitutionally permissible alternative courses of ac-
tion."' The idea behind such decisions is to engage in a dia-
"' See generally CHEmmINSKY, supra note 214, at 764-768
310 Id.
.' Erik Luna, Constitutional Roadmaps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 1125,
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logue with other decision-makers in the executive and legisla-
tive branches, as well as with the citizenry. 12 As Luna says,
"[r]oadmaps openly share constitutional concerns with those
institutions charged with making and enforcing law, refracting
issues with judicial insight rather than merely reflecting them
back to the political branches.""' 8 Altt~ough Luna believes that
judicial resort to such roadmaps should be rare, he also states
that they are most likely to be useful in individual rights cases
involving new practices where the need for clear rules is high,
a scenario which resonates with the advent of CCTV. 314 The
discussion below tries to set out a constitutional roadmap for
public camera surveillance, relying on Fourth Amendment
precedent for guiding principles and the ABA's Standards Re-
lating to Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance for
slightly more specific recommendations.1 5
A. Justification
The government should be required to justify its use of
cameras at two different levels. First, it should have to justify
the placement of the cameras it seeks to install. Second, it
should have to account for any use of the camera to individual-
ize its inspection of particular individuals. Precedent for re-
quiring both types of justifications comes from the Supreme
Court's cases on roadblocks, which, it will be remembered, were
viewed by the subjects in the study reported above to be signifi-
cantly less intrusive than CCTV.
1. Justifying Camera Location
One might think that the cost of camera systems, alone,
would keep CCTV from spreading beyond those areas with the
1193 (2000).
" Id. at 1185-87.
" Id. at 1193.
"' Id. at 1200-06.
' See generally Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveil-
lance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J. L.
& TECHNOLOGY 383 (1997)(describing the membership and work of the Task Force
and the Standards Committee in developing the Standards).
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highest crime rates. But, if Great Britain's experience is any
indication, cameras are likely to be seen as a cheap, effective
method of deterring and detecting crime, whether or not that is
actually the case."1 6 Thus, their proliferation beyond the most
dangerous areas is inevitable, unless limitations are imposed.
The precedent for that limitation comes from an unlikely
source, the Supreme Court's roadblock jurisprudence.317 In
the four cases in which the court has pronounced on the con-
stitutionality of roadblocks, the government has prevailed three
times. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,Is the Court up-
held checkpoints established near the Mexican border that
were designed to deter and detect illegal immigration. In Mich-
igan v. Sitz, 19 it sanctioned roadblocks to deter drunken driv-
ing. And in Delaware v. Prouse,32° it indicated in dictum that
license checkpoints would be constitutional as well (in the
course of holding that random license checks of individual cars
are unconstitutional).3 '
In a case decided just last term, however, the Court drew
the line at roadblocks that are set up merely to help the gov-
ernment catch more criminals. In Edmond v. Indianapolis,3 22
.l See supra note 94; see also Davies, supra note 38, at 150 (observing that
every year between 230 and 450 million dollars is spent on CCTV in the United
Kingdom, despite its uncertain effectiveness).
.1. Note that, given the intrusiveness ratings of the coal mine and factory
inspection scenarios, see supra p. 277 Table 1, another source of precedent would
be the closely regulated industry cases. See CHARLES H. WHrrEBREAD & CHRISTO-
PHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES & CONCEPTS
§ 13.03(a) (4th ed. 2000)(describing the cases). But these decisions deal with spe-
cific industries, not the public at large, so roadblocks provide a closer analogue to
CCTV. It is worth noting, however, that the pervasively regulated industry cases
require the government to show a 'substantial" interest in the activity being
regulated, and also require limitations on when and how searches can be carried
out that provide "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." Dewey v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1981).
'8 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976).
19 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
3" 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979).
321 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 ("This holding does not preclude the State of Dela-
ware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less
intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Question-
ing of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.").
'2 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a "narcotics checkpoint," stating "[w]e have never ap-
proved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."" Martinez-
Fuerte, O'Connor stated, was grounded on the "formidable law
enforcement problems" connected with "effectively containing
illegal immigration at the border," the "impracticality of the
particularized study of a given car to discern whether it was
transporting illegal aliens," and the traditional leeway given
the government's efforts at protecting the "integrity of the bor-
der."24 The sobriety checkpoints in Sitz were permissible
because they were aimed at reducing "the immediate vehicle-
bound threat to life and limb" posed by the presence of drunk
drivers on the highways." And license checkpoints of the
type discussed in Prouse, O'Connor stated, are meant to main-
tain highway safety through ensuring that drivers are qualified
and that their vehicles are fit for safe operation."s None of
these roadblock variants, the Edmond majority emphasized,
are established to further the government's "general interest in
crime control." 27 In the latter situation, an "individualized
suspicion" requirement prevails."s Otherwise, "the Fourth
Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from
becoming a routine part of American life." 29
There is no doubt that the "primary purpose" of CCTV is to
implement the government's general interest in crime control.
If we assume, as concluded above, that CCTV is regulated by
the Fourth Amendment, Edmond could be read to prohibit
government use of cameras, unless it first develops individual-
ized suspicion. That would effectively eliminate CCTV as a
- Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
324Id. at 38.
32 Id. at 43.
032 Id. at 39.
" Id. at 43-44.
"2 Id. at 44.
" Id. at 42. The same Term the Court struck down a drug-testing policy
aimed at pregnant women, in large part because the "primary purpose" of the
program was "the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into
treatment." Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
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deterrent and seriously limit its usefulness as an investigative
device, except in those rare instances when individualized sus-
picion is developed in other ways and cameras are needed to
provide corroboration or help nab a suspect who has eluded
police.
More generously, Edmond could be interpreted to permit
suspicionless public camera surveillance if the government
meets the requirements imposed by Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz. In
other words, only where it can be shown that there are "formi-
dable law enforcement problems" associated with using tradi-
tional methods of investigation (as in the case of discerning
illegal immigrants in cars) or an "immediate hazard to life and
limb" posed by a specified group of potentially dangerous peo-
ple (as with drunk drivers) should CCTV be permissible.
Where might such circumstances exist? Areas with a high
magnitude of serious crime are the best candidates. A signifi-
cant amount of crime suggests that traditional methods are not
working, and if much of the crime being committed is violent or
similarly serious, it presents an immediate hazard proportion-
ate to that posed by drunk drivers.
Taking a cue from the Court's cases, it is possible to get
even more specific about the degree of harm necessary to justi-
fy brief suspicionless surveillance. In Sitz the Court gave as
one of the reasons the checkpoint in that case was reasonable
the fact that 1.6% of the drivers who went through the road-
block in that case were drunk, and also noted that .12% of
those stopped at the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte were illegal
immigrants.3 The latter percentage might presumptively be
considered the threshold at which government can act, for two
reasons. First, it justified only the barest of seizures, one that
lasted at most five seconds and that often consisted merely of
getting the vehicle to slow down so that border agents could
look inside.' Anything less intrusive would probably not
have implicated the Fourth Amendment at all; anything more
m Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
... Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546 ("The 'point' agent standing between the
two lanes of traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the checkpoint
brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. Most motorists are allowed to resume
their progress without any oral inquiry or close visual examination.").
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should require at least as much justification as the government
proffered in Martinez-Fuerte. Second, the Court has indicated it
is leery of suspicionless seizures that inconvenience large num-
bers of individuals for very little gain. In finding unconstitu-
tional the random license checks at issue in Prouse, it noted
that "[it seems common sense that the percentage of all driv-
ers on the road who are driving without a license is very small
and that the number of licensed drivers who will be stopped in
order to find one unlicensed operator will be large indeed."332
Although Prouse went on to sanction nonrandom roadblocks for
license check purposes,"' this type of seizure, Edmond held,
is permitted only when it is directly related to highway safety,
and not set up with the primary purpose of crime control. In
the latter instance, Prouse and Edmond in combination would
seem to say that hit rates lower than those obtained in Marti-
nez-Fuerte cannot justify searches or seizures by the govern-
ment.
In somewhat arbitrary terms, then, CCTV might only be
permitted in areas where more than one person in 1000 will
commit violent or similarly serious crime. 3 It might also be
permissible in more idiosyncratic circumstances. For instance,
cameras could perhaps be positioned in areas that are not par-
ticularly dangerous, but are predicted to be because of some
imminent threat to life and limb, such as terrorism.35 Study
"2 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659-60.
"4 Id. at 663.
"4 It might be noted that the "hit rate" for the checkpoint declared unconstitu-
tional in Edmond was much higher. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35 (9% of those who
were stopped at roadblock were guilty of some crime). But it appears that the
crimes detected by the Edmond checkpoint were primarily low-level drug viola-
tions, not violent offenses. Id.
" See id. at 44 ("the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or
to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route").
Cameras might also be set up in certain areas, but switched off except during
particular times or events. See Testimony of Charles H. Ramsey, Chief of Police,
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, at Hearing on Privacy vs. Security: Elec-
tronic Surveillance in the Nation's Capital, before House Comm. on Gov't Reform,
Subcomm. on Dist. Colum., March 22, 2002, at 3 (on file with author):
Access to outside systems is controlled by the agency that operates the
cameras, not the Metropolitan Police Department. The only way the MPD
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of crime patterns might also identify some locales that are
particularly likely to attract certain types of serious criminal
activity or harbor dangerous criminals."
A corollary question is: Who decides whether crime in a
given area is of sufficient magnitude to warrant CCTV-a court,
a legislature, the police or the public? In rejecting a judicial
determination of a roadblock's "effectiveness" at dealing with
drunk driving, the Court in Sitz stated it would not "transfer
from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision
as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement
techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public
danger." 7 It went on to conclude that, "for purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have
a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited
public resources, including a finite number of police offi-
cers."
338
While this language appears to leave quite a bit up to
police discretion, it also endorses two significant limitations on
that discretion. First, courts are not left out of the picture en-
tirely. They are still permitted to intervene when the alterna-
tive chosen by the police is not "reasonable." Second,
decisionmaking authority is not delegated to any or every offi-
cer, but rather only to "politically accountable" officials who
have "responsibility for limited public resources." In other
words, the chief of the department ought to be responsible for
these decisions. That conclusion makes sense, given that
official's better access to the relevant statistics and the number
of people affected by the decision.339
will be able to access the [schools'] video system is if school officials ask
us to do so, and then provide the 'key' to grant us access.
" Cf Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IowA L. REv. 1107, 1173 (2000)
("Criminologists have offered geographic theories of target hunting, fugitive migra-
tion, crime trips, escape routes, and repeat location victimization, as well as theo-
ries of aggregate behavior based on market distribution, crime displacement, and
police-crackdown effects.").
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
ssa Id. at 453-54.
The commentary to the ABA Standards sets out in more detail reasons to
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This last observation also raises the issue of whether the
public should be involved in the decisionmaking to any extent.
The Court has not specifically addressed this question. But
William Stuntz has argued that Sitz stands for the proposition
that the public should be directly involved in such cases.'
More specifically, he posits that Sitz indicates the Court's will-
ingness to abandon both the individualized suspicion and spe-
cial needs models of the Fourth Amendment in favor of what
he calls a "politics model" when searches or seizures affect
large groups of people, because a group, unlike the solitary
suspect who is usually the target of searches and seizures, can
"throw the rascals out" if it does not like a particular tech-
nique.
41
If Stuntz is right about the Court's underlying motivation
in Sitz, the practical problem becomes how to implement this
"politics model." The typical electoral process, which is likely to
involve many issues, is not an effective way for the group to
make its attitudes toward a particular police action known. A
more satisfactory implementation of the model would be to
require direct input on the establishment of camera systems
from those who will enjoy the benefit and bear the brunt of the
surveillance. Such input can also provide the police with infor-
mation about specific crime problems and the type of surveil-
lance that might prove most useful.342 It is instructive that
involve politically accountable decisionmakers:
First, these decisionmakers are more representative of the public than is
a supervisor or field officer. In addition a decision which is likely to affect
large numbers of people for a long period of time should not be made by
a low-level official, regardless of the latter's expertise and knowledge of
local conditions. Finally, only at the departmental level are the relevant
statistics necessary for documenting a crime problem likely to be
available.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 69.
'i William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553 (1992).
341 Id. at 588.
' One question raised by this comment is whether the public can "force" the
installation of cameras when it is not warranted under the foregoing analysis.
Professors Meares and Kahan argue that when "the community has internalized
the burden that a particular law imposes on individual freedom" courts "should
presume that the law does not violate individual rights." Tracey L. Meares &
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several participants at the International Association of Police
Chiefs meeting on CCTV were adamant about involving the
affected community in decisions involving cameras.343
The American Bar Association's Standards on Technologi-
cally-Assisted Physical Surveillance address all of these con-
cerns about the decision to establish cameras. They state that
CCTV "is permissible when a politically accountable govern-
mental authority concludes that the surveillance will not view
a private activity or condition and will be reasonably likely to
achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective."344 The latter
phrase is defined to require "articulable reasons" for concluding
that the surveillance will lead to the detection, deterrence or
prevention of crime 5 which, after Edmond, should require a
demonstration that a significant violent crime problem will be
addressed by the surveillance. The Standards also require that
"where deterrence rather than investigation is the primary
object, the public to be affected by the surveillance... [should
have] the opportunity, both prior to the initiation of the surveil-
lance and periodically during it, to express its views of the sur-
veillance and propose changes in its execution, through a hear-
ing or some other appropriate means." 4 ' These are the kinds
of general guidelines the courts can fashion based on Fourth
Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chi-
cago v. Morales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 209. But the "community" is hard to
gauge. Compare Remarks of Joseph Dunne, supra note 86, at 21 ("Virtually every
housing development in New York City has requested a CCTV monitoring pro-
gram") with Burrows, supra note 56, at 1082 (describing how cameras were in-
stalled when long-term, largely elderly residents became concerned about crime as
black and hispanic individuals moved nearby). And while arguments can be made
that community views are dispositive on the privacy issue, see supra text accom-
panying notes 286-306, it is clear that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is ulti-
mately a judicial matter. Nonetheless, if a "well-informed" community (cf supra
note 144), clearly favors cameras, a (rebuttable) presumption in their favor may
be a workable approach.
' See, e.g., Remarks of Lessing Gold, supra note 99, at 19 (stating "we must
form a coalition or partnership with law enforcement, city council, citizens groups
and private sector"); Jerry Semper (Maryland Police Trainer), at SIA & IACP
Meeting, supra note 62, at 55 (stating "community inclusion is the most impor-
tant aspect of what we've got going on here").
3" ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 16 (Standard 2-9.3(b)(i)).
3' ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 14-15 (Standard 2-9.2(d)).
3" ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 16 (Standard 2-9.3(b)(ii)).
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Amendment principles.
2. Justifying Individualization of Surveillance
If the Edmond standard is met for a particular area, then
CCTV cameras can be established there consistent with the
Fourth Amendment. Randomly panning the camera to scan the
streets ought to be permissible on the same showing, just as
the brief initial stops in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were permit-
ted without any individualized suspicion. But what if the cam-
era operators want to record or closely observe a particular
person's actions, using zoom capacity, or simply through pro-
longed or repeated surveillance? For instance, the only compre-
hensive study of CCTV operator behavior found that in approx-
imately 600 hours of observation almost 900 "targeted
surveillances" of more than a minute occurred, with roughly
three out of ten lasting between two minutes and six minutes,
and one-quarter lasting longer than six minutes. 7
Here again, the roadblock cases lead the way. In Sitz, the
Court cautioned that it was addressing "only the initial stop of
each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated
preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers.
Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobri-
ety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspi-
cion standard." 8 Similarly, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court felt
it important to note that the percentage of illegal immigrants
discovered at the "secondary checkpoint" to which motorists
were sent after the initial stop was close to 2 0 %,M9 a figure
that demonstrates a relatively high level of suspicion associated
with this seizure, which amounted to a five-minute document
check.35
0
These cases suggest that something more than an inchoate
hunch ought to form the basis for intense scrutiny of individu-
als. Certainly use of audio capacity to eavesdrop on private
conversations on the street ought to be based on individualized
'4 NORRIS & ARMSTRONG, supra note 44, at 150.
3" Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
349 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 at 564 n.17.
35 Id. at 547.
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suspicion, presumably at the probable cause level.35 ' Like-
wise, if the camera is used to intrude into the interior of the
home, probable cause should be required. 52
Short of these two situations, determining precisely when
surveillance progresses from random scanning or casual sur-
veillance to observation intense enough to warrant individual-
ized suspicion may be difficult. But it will not be any more
difficult than defining when a nonseizure becomes a seizure, or
determining when a stop requiring reasonable suspicion be-
comes an arrest requiring probable cause, issues with which
the Supreme Court has grappled-not always satisfactorily-on
several occasions."' 3 Two factors that ought to be relevant
here, according to the ABA Standards, are "the extent to which
the surveillance technology enhances the law enforcement
officer's natural senses" and "the extent to which the surveil-
lance of subjects is minimized in time and space.3 If the
camera's zoom or recording capacity allows operators to obtain
information that would be difficult for an observer on the street
to discern (such as a title on a book cover, or a biometric match
with official records), then reasonable suspicion ought to be re-
quired; the same standard ought to be met if the cameras in-
tentionally follow an individual for a prolonged period of time
(say, more than the five minutes involved at the secondary
checkpoint in Martinez Fuerte) or on several separate occasions
(analogous to Rehnquist's bar example). Even a targeted sur-
veillance lasting only a minute should require an articulated
reason beyond mere curiosity (such as a signal from one of the
automated systems described earlier 55). The amount of indi-
vidualized scrutiny permitted should be roughly proportionate
to the amount of individualized suspicion the government has
developed.
These latter proposals may appear to contradict the Court's
decision in Knotts, upholding suspicionless tracking of public
31 See supra notes 167 & 280.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 245-47.
See WHMrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 317, § 3.02 (describing cases
defining arrest) & § 11.02 (describing cases defining "seizure").
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 12 (Standards 2-9.1(cXii)(E) & (F)).
See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
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movements, using a beeper. 5 But the beeper only indicates
the location of an object or person; video surveillance provides
government with much more. More importantly, unlike the
beeper, CCTV is overt, and thus generates a much greater
panoptic effect. In any event, the results of the study reported
earlier indicate that using a beeper to monitor travel was rated
as almost as intrusive as a frisk, 57 suggesting that members
of the public believe that prolonged tracking with a beeper is
much more invasive than the Court seems to think.
B. Execution Issues
The traditional search or seizure must not only be justified,
but must also be executed in a reasonable manner. Based on
the Court's caselaw, three execution issues associated with
CCTV might rise to the constitutional level. They concern no-
tice of the surveillance, the types of individuals to be observed,
and termination of the surveillance.
1. Notice
If the point of CCTV is deterrence, as its advocates claim,
then notification of those subject to camera surveillance is
imperative. 58 Independently of this government interest, the
Fourth Amendment also imposes a notice requirement. One of
the primary reasons the Court gave in Martinez-Fuerte for
finding the intrusion associated with the roadblocks in that
case "minimal" was that, given the signs announcing their
existence, motorists were "not taken by surprise;" further, be-
cause of this notification, they "know, or may obtain knowledge
of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped else-
where."59 The Court also stated that the intrusion was fur-
3w See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
"' The beeper scenario received a mean intrusiveness rating of 63, while the
frisk was rated at 68. See Table 1, supra, p. 277.
" Zuckerman, supra note 32 (quoting Simon Davies as saying that, in the
United Kingdom, "with 1.5 million cameras about, the signs would be a public
nuisance. So there's a general acceptance that wherever you go, you will have
cameras pointed at you.").
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
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ther minimized because the checkpoints appeared to be "duly
authorized,""6 another function signs can carry out.
Other Court decisions upholding suspicionless government
actions have reaffirmed that notice is an important means of
meeting Fourth Amendment requirements. For instance, in
Von Raab v. United States, 6' involving drug testing of people
who applied and worked for the customs service, the Court
emphasized that "[elmployees are... notified in advance of the
scheduled sample collection, thus reducing to a minimum any
'unsettling show of authority' [citing Prouse] that may be asso-
ciated with unexpected intrusions on privacy."6 2 In Wyman v.
James, permitting suspicionless welfare inspections of the
home, the Court reasoned that providing a welfare recipient
with advance notice of the inspection minimized the intrusion
on privacy occasioned by the visit. 3 A number of Court cases
also suggest that suspicionless searches are more palatable
when the targets "consent" to them ahead of time, which is im-
possible without some sort of notice." 4
2. Avoiding Discriminatory Surveillance
The second execution issue of possible constitutional signif-
icance is the selection of people to be observed by the cameras.
Because no suspicion is required for camera surveillance as it
is practiced today, and because even in the regime proposed
here discretion as to whom to target is considerable, significant
potential for discrimination exists. Indeed, research in the
United Kingdom indicates that bias against minority groups is
sm Id.
"1 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
.. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
657 (1979)).
3- Wyman, 400 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1971).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591-92 (2001X"The pro-
bation order [allowing suspicionless searches of probationers] clearly expressed the
search condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it"); United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)(in holding that warrantless, suspicionless
searches of gun dealers are permissible, stating "[wihen a dealer chooses to en-
gage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he
does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition
will be subject to effective inspection.").
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widespread among camera operators. Norris and Armstrong
report, for instance, that the CCTV practices they observed
involved a "massively disproportionate targeting of young
males, particularly if they are black or visibly identifiable as
having subcultural affiliations."'65 This differentiation, they
concluded, was "not based on objective behavioural and
individualised criteria, but merely on being categorised as part
of a particular social group."3"
Such practices are probably unconstitutional. In Whren v.
United States,36 7 for instance, the Supreme Court signaled
that searches and seizures that result from intentional racial
discrimination could violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause."' Although proof of such intent is notori-
ously difficult, 69 every step possible should be taken to as-
sure that, in the words of the ABA Standards, "[tihe subjects of
the surveillance [are] not ... selected in an arbitrary or dis-
criminatory manner.
" 370
3. Termination of the Surveillance
The final execution issue that might trigger constitutional
analysis concerns the termination of individual surveillance.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of dura-
tional limitations in many of its decisions defining the scope of
the Fourth Amendment. In upholding the checkpoints in Marti-
'® NORRIS & ARMSTRONG, supra 44, at 150.
' Id. They also reported that 30% of targeted surveillances on black people,
but only 13% of targeted surveillances on whites, lasted nine minutes or more,
id., and that blacks, teens and males were much more likely to be targeted for
"no obvious reason" compared to other groups. Id. at 113-16 (Tables 6.5, 6.7,
6.9)(68% of blacks, compared to 35% of whites; 65% of teens, compared to 38% of
ages 20-29; and 21% of ages 30-39; 47% of males, compared to 16% of females
were targeted for "no obvious reason").
86 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 ("We of course agree with petitioners that the Con-
stitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such
as race.").
"s' See generally, David A. Harris, When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming
Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 237
(2000)(detailing difficulties of proving violations of anti-discrimination laws).
'"' ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 12 (Standard 2-9.1(dXi)).
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nez-Fuerte, it pointed out that the initial stop was extremely
brief and that the secondary documentary check lasted only
about five minutes. 7' In Sitz as well it found the initial stop,
which averaged twenty-five seconds, to be a "minimal" intru-
sion, as "measured by the duration of the seizure and the in-
tensity of the investigation."3 2 The Court has also suggested,
in United States v. Sharpe,373 that stops based on reasonable
suspicion should not last longer than fifteen minutes or twenty
minutes in the absence of extenuating circumstances. 74
When it comes to CCTV, these cases suggest that, in the
ABA's language, the "surveillance should be limited to its au-
thorized objectives and be terminated when those objectives are
achieved."375 And these cases could be mined for even more
specific guidelines. Parallel to Martinez-Fuerte and consistent
with the discussion concerning individualization of surveillance,
camera operators could be required to terminate surveillance of
a particular individual after five minutes unless reasonable
suspicion develops.376 In cases where such suspicion develops
they could be required, parallel to Sharpe, to cease surveillance
if probable cause doesn't develop within the next fifteen min-
utes, unless extenuating circumstances are present. These
rules would have significant impact, since research indicates
371 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546-47.
3- Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444.
3" 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
S1 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. Although the Court firmly rejected a bright-line
20-minute limitation on Terry stops as "clearly and fundamentally at odds with
our approach in this area," id. at 686, it went on to justify the 20-minute stop in
Sharpe on the ground that the defendant's evasions were in part responsible for
the delay, and in part on the ground that the officer made diligent efforts to
expedite the detention. Id. at 686-87.
'" ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 12 (Standard 2-9.1(dXii)).
'7' One objection to this rule is that, once made known to the citizenry (see
infra text accompanying notes 415-16), it will be manipulated by perpetrators who
will simply wait five minutes before engaging in any suspicious activity. However,
the five-minute period need not start when the subject enters the camera area
(and in fact shouldn't start at all unless something suspicious occurs, see supra
text accompanying notes 347-57), which can be made clear in the rule disseminat-
ed to the public. Such a rule could simply read: "Camera operators will not focus
on individuals unless they engage in activity indicative of criminal intent or are
in need of aid, and will not continue surveillance unless criminal intent or harm
is confirmed."
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that CCTV surveillance can last well over five minutes even in
cases where no deployment or arrest results. 7
C. Storage and Dissemination of Recordings
A principal feature of CCTV that distinguishes it from
ordinary, non-technological surveillance is the capacity to re-
cord observations. That capacity, plus the potential for abuse of
the information so generated, is apparently of major concern to
the public. The British survey quoted earlier indicated that
many of the people questioned were very worried about misuse
of the images recorded on CCTV,3 7' an anxiety that is well-
founded.179 In the study conducted for this article, the scenar-
io in which the tapes are not destroyed and instead are made
available to the media and other government agencies "as need-
ed" received a much higher intrusiveness rating (M=73) than
the scenario in which tapes are destroyed within 96 hours
(M=53).'o Indeed, the former rating is statistically indistin-
guishable from the ratings associated with a body cavity search
at the border and search of a bedroom, actions which require
probable cause.
The Supreme Court has never addressed this particular
type of privacy invasion as a Fourth Amendment matter. It
came close in Wilson v. Layne," l where it held that the
Fourth Amendment was violated by a "media ride-along" in
"' Norris & Armstrong found that somewhere around 12% to 15% of all tar-
geted surveillances lasted over nine minutes (although that percentage increased
to 25% for blacks), and that close to 40% lasted between two and six minutes.
NoRRIS & ARMSTRONG, supra note 44, at 150. Deployment resulted in only 5% of
targeted surveillances, and arrest occurred in only 24% of deployments. Id. at
168.
278 See supra text accompanying note 264-67 (showing, inter alia, that 72%
believed that cameras "could easily be abused and used by the wrong people").
See Blackmail Concern as CCTV Video Sex Footage Goes on Sale, THE HER-
ALD (Glasgow), Nov. 27, 1995, at 5 (recounting sale of CCTV clips and public
release of tapes showing a prostitute providing oral sex to a businessman and a
man in a Santa hat stripping and then masturbating); WILLIAM G. STAPLES, EV-
ERYDAY SURVEILLANCE: VIGILANCE AND VISIILITY IN POSTMODERN LIFE 61-62
(2000)(describing the "potential market for tapes," and the high sales of the
"Caught on Tape" and "Really Caught on Tape" videos).
" See supra Table 1, supra p. 277
381 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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which a newspaper reporter and photographer accompanied
police on a search of a house. There, however, the issue was
solely whether the presence of the media at the time of the
search was unconstitutional; because the ride-along was not "in
aid" of the search's execution, it unconstitutionally infringed on
the privacy of the search's target."8 2 Layne did not address
the lawfulness of later dissemination of information about the
search, whether acquired by the media at the time it occurs or
from police at some later point. In the CCTV context, then,
Layne at most would ban the media and other non-law enforce-
ment entities from being present during the surveillance.
Other Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest the Con-
stitution requires law enforcement to keep a tight rein on infor-
mation it accumulates. In Whalen v. Roe,"ss the Court consid-
ered a Fourteenth Amendment privacy challenge to a state
statute that required physicians to submit information about
patients' drug use to a state agency. Although the Court upheld
the statute, it made much of the state's efforts to maintain
security over the information submitted and the fact that the
records were destroyed after five years.' At the end of its
opinion, it also noted "the threat to privacy implicit in the accu-
mulation of vast amounts of personal information in computer-
ized data banks or other massive government files," and stated
that "in some circumstances" a "duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures ... arguably has its roots in the Constitution.""8
Citing Whalen, the Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston
concluded that "[tihe reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed
by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital
is that the results of those tests will not be shared with non-
'8 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
'u 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
' Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601 ("There is no support in the record, or in the
experience of the two States that New York has emulated, for an assumption
that the security provisions of the statute will be administered improperly."). The
Court also noted that it did not need to address the constitutionality of "the
unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data whether intentional or unin-
tentional or by a system that did not contain comparable security provisions." Id.
at 605-06.
31 id. at 605.
[VOL. 72
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 302 2002-2003
PUBLIC PRIVACY
medical personnel without her consent." 8 Also relying on
Whalen, the Court in Department of Justice v. Reporters Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press stated that "the fact that an
event is not wholly 'private' does not mean that an individual
has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the
information."' That case went on to hold that, under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), government-maintained
rap sheets on criminals need not be disclosed to the press be-
cause they did not further the FOIA's "central purpose" of ex-
posing to public scrutiny official information that sheds light on
an agency's performance of its statutory duties. 88
These cases indicate that the Court is willing to interpret
the Constitution and statutory mandates to circumscribe disclo-
sure of private information gathered by the government. In the
CCTV setting, the content of these rules might vary widely.
With respect to storage of information, a jurisdiction might
require that all recordings not relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion be destroyed within a short period of time (the ninety-six
hour limitation used in the survey reported in this article co-
mes from Baltimore's policy 89). Or it could opt for a much
longer maintenance period, in the belief that the usefulness of
particular tapes, either to inculpate or exculpate, may not be-
come apparent until significant time has elapsed. The impor-
tant feature here is to ensure the security of the recordings.
With respect to dissemination, the Court's cases suggest that
allowing information to be used for non-law enforcement pur-
poses ought to be permitted only under compelling circumstanc-
es, if at all. The ABA Standards recommend that "disclosures
be prohibited unless affirmatively authorized by statute, judi-
cial decision or agency rule."3" That language echoes the .Sitz
mandate that decisions affecting large segments of the public
532 U.S. 67, 78 & n.14 (2001).
489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989).
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774.
' See Remarks of Stephen McMahon, supra 68, at 6.
', ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 13 (Standard 2-9.1(dXviXcomment). See
Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 85-92 (1995Xgiving reasons for requiring disclo-
sure rules to be promulgated by deliberative bodies).
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be left to politically accountable officials.
Before leaving this subject, mention must be made of a
provocative proposal made by William Stuntz. I have argued
here that, in addition to rules regarding disclosure, we need
rules concerning justification and implementation. Stuntz sug-
gests that, at least when government engages in "secret search-
es," we might profitably consider focusing solely on disclosure
rules. 91 More specifically, he proposes that government be
allowed to carry out such searches randomly, without having to
demonstrate any suspicion, on condition that it be permitted to
use the information it obtains only in prosecutions for serious,
violent crimes. 92 That approach, he asserts "would allow us
to give both the police and private citizens more of what they
value-easier evidence-gathering and reduced risk of embarrass-
ment or harassment."
393
Although CCTV, as defined in this article, is not conducted
secretly, it could be.39 Stuntz would allow such covert use at
the whim of the police, as long as the disclosure rule is fol-
lowed. No one would know their right to anonymity had been
invaded unless and until they are prosecuted for a serious
crime. Why not institute this regime rather than bother with
the elaborate rules discussed to this point?
One concern is whether government can be trusted to limit
its use of the information it obtains through covert CCTV to
prosecutions of serious crimes. Given the secret nature of these
searches, finding the "poisonous tree" in prosecutions for non-
serious crimes may be difficult.3 95 Furthermore, of course,
39 William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137,
2183-84 (2002)("The law could allow a given search tactic whenever the police
want to engage in it, but forbid public disclosure of anything uncovered save in a
criminal trial.")
39 Id. at 2184.
39 Id. at 2185.
s' See UPI, supra note 54 (describing new CCTV system in Hull, England "us-
ing tiny cameras disguised in street lamps or concealed on buildings to transmit
pictures to a monitoring center around the clock.')
"9 Informants can always be manufactured when necessary to cover illegal
investigation practices. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and
What To Do About It, 67 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1037, 1043 n. 28 (1996Xdiscussing
"the invention of 'confidential informants' . . . , a ploy that allows police to cover
up irregularities in developing probable cause or to assert they have probable
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barring use of surveillance results in court does not provide
any disincentive to police who intend to use CCTV feeds solely
to harass "flawed consumers" or take other actions they know
will not lead to charges being filed."9
The more important problem with the elimination of justi-
fication and execution rules, however, has to do with the right
to anonymity. Stuntz' proposal might not openly infringe that
right for those not prosecuted, but it insidiously trenches on
everyone's right to avoid suspicionless government scrutiny.
Indeed, in the CCTV context, once the public becomes aware
that random covert surveillance is occurring, as it inevitably
would after a few prosecutions in which the covertly gleaned
information is used, the panoptic effect of this regime will be
greater than occurs with overt CCTV. Although the survey
results reported earlier suggest otherwise (with the covert
scenario ranked significantly lower than the overt scenar-
io397), the covert scenario used in the survey implied that the
surveillance was limited to one location.398 In Stuntz' society,
by contrast, we would assume that secret surveillance was
pervasive, not just incidental. That would move us one step
closer to an Orwellian society, because we would no longer
know when and where government is attempting to find out
what we are doing in public; in other words, we would not
know when or how to protect against invasion of our public
anonymity. Probably no passage in Orwell's novel 1984 is more
chilling than the one partially excerpted at the beginning of
this article: "There was of course no way of knowing whether
you were being watched at any given moment.... It was even
conceivable that they watched everybody all the time."3
cause when in fact all they have is a hunch.")
39 See infra note 408-09 and accompanying text.
31 See Table 1 (covert scenario (M=42); overt scenario (M=53)), supra p. 277.
31 Specifically, the scenario read as follows: "Police at a central control center
monitoring hidden video cameras positioned at 300-yard intervals that can zoom
in on the face and body of a person." Survey form, supra note 274.
3'9 ORWELL, supra note 3, at 6.
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D. Accountability
Even overt CCTV can be covert in the sense that we may
not know precisely when publicly placed cameras are being
used to watch us, or for how long, or with what level of justifi-
cation, if any. And if we do not have that information, the rules
described above cannot be enforced. Even with that informa-
tion, reliance on the police to hold themselves accountable for a
violation of the rules, which is the current approach, is unlikely
to ensure full compliance. Finally, even good faith efforts at full
compliance with the rules will not achieve their ultimate goal
as long as people still feel significant panoptic effects. Unless
people believe they are free from camera observation most of
the time they are in public, constitutionalizing police use of
CCTV does not do much good. All three of these concerns de-
serve some attention.
1. Watching the Watchers
The rules concerning individualization, discrimination and
termination comprise what could be called "conduct-of-surveil-
lance" rules, since they have to do with the actual operation of
the cameras. How can we know when camera operators are
scrutinizing a particular individual for a prolonged period of
time despite a lack of articulable suspicion? How do we make
sure that the police refrain from using cameras in a discrimina-
tory fashion?
Self-reports probably will not work. Operators may not
even recognize their discriminatory practices, and if they did,
they are hardly likely to confess them. Similarly, suspicion is
always easy to manufacture in hindsight, if the searcher has
control of the facts."° As the ABA Standards admonish, police
must develop "administrative rules which ensure that the infor-
mation necessary for ... accountability exists,' 0 1 a sentiment
' See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA.
L. REV. 881, 913-15 (1991)(discussing the ease with which police can commit per-
jury at suppression hearings, given their ability to reconstruct what happened
based on knowledge of what was found, the tendency to believe police rather than
criminal defendants, and the hindsight biasing effect created by arrest).
"01 ABA STANDMWS, supra note 16, at 13 (Standard 2-9.1(faxi))(emphasis add-
[VOL. 72
HeinOnline  -- 72 Miss. L.J. 306 2002-2003
PUBLIC PRIVACY
that is not inconsistent with Fourth Amendment tenets.4 °2
David Brin has argued that the best way to control the
government (and everyone else) in a surveillance-happy "trans-
parent society" is to watch the watchers.4 3 That idea could be
implemented in the CCTV context in at least two ways. Cam-
era tapes could be "audited" periodically and randomly by inde-
pendent reviewers to determine whether operators are violating
any of the rules. Or the watchers really could be watched, by
cameras. That method would not only capture the facts nec-
essary to determine whether conduct of surveillance standards
are obeyed, but also bring home to operators the panoptic ef-
fects their surveillance has on others, thus perhaps curbing
voyeuristic and other unnecessary observation.
2. Assuring Compliance
Assuming a violation is discovered, what should be done?
As noted earlier, police favor "voluntary guidelines," by which
they appear to mean rules that they not only develop, but also
enforce. The history of police willingness to punish their own
for violations that involve balancing abstract concepts like
"privacy" against law enforcement needs is well-known and not
impressive.41 Some other accountability mechanism is neces-
ed).
The Supreme Court has indicated that the failure to maintain accurate re-
cords about the result of a search is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment
when the underlying search is valid. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 449
(1973X"As these items were constitutionally seized, we do not deem it constitu-
tionally significant that they were not listed in the return of the warrant."). But
it has yet to address this issue where the validity of the search is questionable
or indeterminable because of police failure to provide adequate information. Fur-
thermore, it has held that the Fourth Amendment is violated when police inten-
tionally hide or mischaracterize information relevant to a search. Franks v. Dela-
ware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)("where the defendant makes a substantial pre-
liminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affi-
davit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable
cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's
request").
DAvID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998).
40' See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF
POLICE INVESTIGATION 563-65 (2d ed. 1998)(describing ineffectiveness of adminis-
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sary.
In the Fourth Amendment context, that mechanism has
usually been exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 5 Cer-
tainly that sanction should be invoked when it applies. But it is
unlikely to be a potent deterrent in connection with the types
of rules at issue here.
Take first the rules concerning individualization, discrimi-
nation and termination-the conduct-of-surveillance rules. The
most important reason exclusion does not do a good job encour-
aging compliance with these types of rules is that the vast
majority of people subject to camera surveillance, and therefore
most people whose activities are observed in violation of the
rules, will never be prosecuted, either because they are com-
pletely innocent or commit infractions that are taken care of on
the street.' In short, most violations of the right to public
anonymity will not be redressed through exclusion. That is not
a good prescription for ensuring deterrence. 7
Moreover, when police do want to prosecute crimes illicitly
discovered through camera surveillance, they will frequently be
able to avoid exclusion. First, exclusion may not be required if
the field officer who makes an arrest based on information
from a camera operator acts in a good faith belief that no rules
were violated by the operator.4"' Second, police know that if
they can track down eyewitnesses, through the camera tapes or
trative sanctions); JEROME SKOLNICK, JuSTICE WITHouT TRIAL 224 (1975Xasserting
that as long as a search or seizure is "in conformity with administrative norms of
police organization," superiors will be sympathetic).
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 63 (1961).
See NORmIS & ARMSTRONG, supra note 44, at 168 (reporting that arrests
resulted from only 12, or 1.2%, of 986 "targeted surveillances," and that police
deployed by cameras gave "no more than a warning" to 76% of those confronted
by police); see also Norris, supra note 51, at 37 (noting that exclusion of unwant-
ed individuals in CCTV regimes "is achieved without any recourse to the formal
criminal justice system and therefore bypasses legal safeguards embodied in the
public justice of the courts").
' Behavioral theory suggests that unwanted behavior is most likely to be
eliminated if punishment occurs immediately after every unwanted incident. See
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999
ILL. L. REV. 363, 374-377 (applying behavioral theory to exclusionary rule).
40 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)(holding that exclusion is not re-
quired where arresting officer relies on computer records maintained by civilian
court personnel).
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otherwise, the latter's testimony will usually be admissible
even if the testimony of the camera operator and field officer is
tainted by illegal surveillance.' Only if the prosecution of
crimes were barred outright whenever they are discovered
through a violation of CCTV rules would the threat of "exclu-
sion" pose a serious deterrent. But even then, resourceful oper-
ators can hide the poisonous tree through untracked calls to a
field officer.
As a supplement to exclusion, a more direct sanction is
necessary when conduct-of-surveillance rules are violated. In
theory, both damages actions and administrative and criminal
sanctions are far superior to exclusion, because they would not
be dependent on whether prosecution-or indeed on whether
any government action at all-is based on surveillance results.
Criminal prosecutions would probably be considered too draco-
nian or too difficult to bring, however.410 Given the many
limitations on constitutional damage actions that have been
imposed by the courts,4 that method of deterring violations
would not work well either, at least as it is currently
structured." 2 The best sanctioning system may well be an ad-
ministrative penalty, such as a suspension or a dock in pay,
but sought by an entity independent of the police and enforced
by the courts.1
' Cf United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978)(holding that since
witnesses would often come forward of their own accord, and "since the cost of
excluding live-witness testimony often will be greater, a closer, more direct link
between the illegality and that kind of testimony is required" before exclusion of
the witness will occur).
410 See WHTEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 317, at 61-62 (describing obsta-
cles to criminal prosecutions for Fourth Amendment violations).
411 Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the main avenue for constitutional damage
actions, would not be worth the effort for many people who are illegally surveilled
because actual injury in such cases would be negligible, and "symbolic" injury is
not compensable. Memphis School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986). Further,
unless the violation is somehow ratified by a superior, the government would
usually have a "policy or custom" defense. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986).
"' I have suggested methods of significantly reforming the damage regime to
make it a more effective deterrent. See Slobogin, supra note 407, at 384-390.
41 An ombudsman could both conduct the audits and initiate the disciplinary
proceedings. Cf Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73
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The other three rules proposed above concern camera
placement, notice of camera placement, and disclosure of re-
cordings. Here again the exclusionary sanction is not a par-
ticularly good fit. If the placement or notice rules are violated,
exclusion of all evidence garnered through the subsequent sur-
veillance seems like overkill if the other rules are followed, and
in any event would not necessarily stop surveillance aimed at
"flawed consumers." And unlawful disclosure to non-law en-
forcement entities does not even involve a proceeding at which
evidence can be excluded. For the first two types of violations,
it would probably be preferable to seek an injunction ordering
installation to desist or notice to be provided, which courts
could grant when politically accountable officials fail to provide
any "reasonable" explanation for their decision.414 In the lat-
ter instance, damages remedies are probably more feasible
than in other settings,415 although judicially-backed adminis-
trative sanctions are probably necessary as well.
3. Beyond Sanctions: Accountability Through Information
Will any of this do any good? After all, cameras will still be
lawfully installed in some locations. In those areas, won't peo-
ple still feel "watched," regardless of whether the conduct-of-
surveillance and disclosure rules are followed? If so, why both-
er with all of these rules?
These are good questions. At most, the panoptic effects of
J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982).
414 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)(holding that a state official may be
enjoined under § 1983). Because the issue concerns whether a planned CCTV
system may be installed, it is justiciable; the Court's rigid barriers to injunctive
relief against discretionary decisions, see e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983), would be avoided.
'" If dissemination of the tape is widespread, damages are less likely to be
negligible. Cf supra note 411 and accompanying text. Although a constitutional
damages suit against the government might be stalled by a policy and custom
defense, see supra note 411, and the party that receives the tape may be im-
mune, see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), the individuals who release
the tape are still liable. Of course, a state law tort action, based on public dis-
closure of private facts, may also be available. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §652C (1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 46 (1993Xnonconsensual appropriation of name of likeness for commercial pur-
poses is actionable).
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lawfully placed cameras can only be mitigated, not eliminated.
To ensure as much of this mitigation as possible, the conduct-
of-surveillance rules should be promulgated widely, and any
sanctions imposed as a result of their violation should be publi-
cized as well.
Two other proposals, both recommended by the ABA, are
worth consideration. First, "periodic review of the scope and
effectiveness of [the] surveillance" ought to occur.416 Second,
the government should "maintain[] and mak[e] available to the
public general information about the type or types of surveil-
lance being used and the frequency of their use. "417 Right
now, most police departments take neither of these steps."8
That should be rectified. Periodic internal review would ensure
that the government pays attention to whether the cameras are
achieving the crime reduction goal it seeks, and might even re-
sult in the disassembly of some cameras. Review will also pro-
vide information about the nature, frequency and success of
camera surveillance that can be disseminated to the public,
which can then reach its own conclusions about the scope of
surveillance.
Ideally, dissemination of information about CCTV that is
conducted under the rules proposed here will lead to the real-
ization that most of us are of no interest to camera operators.
Fear that our public actions, or images of those actions, will be
scrutinized by faceless bureaucrats or government agents with
a suspect agenda should be allayed. Similar to what occurred
in connection with electronic surveillance after the advent of
legislation requiring strict judicial control over and disclosure
of government wiretapping and bugging practices," 9 we
should be able to rest assured that camera operators will not
watch us simply because they can.
The constitutional basis for these review and publication
416 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 13 (Standard 2-9.1(f(iv)).
417 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 13-14 (Standard 2-9.1(f)(v)).
41 Recall that 96% of the departments surveyed by the IACP do not maintain
information about the effectiveness of their use of CCTV. See supra note 80.
419 18 U.S.C. § 2529(3)(requiring periodic reports of number of surveillance
warrants and warrant extensions, types of crimes investigated with surveillance,
number of people overheard, arrests generated by surveillance, and so on).
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rules is again the Fourth Amendment. After all, that Amend-
ment guarantees a right to be "secure" from unreasonable
searches and seizures.4 2 Knowledge that government has en-
acted rules limiting its surveillance powers, that the rules are
being enforced, and that periodic reports on the implementa-
tion and success of the surveillance will be made public is the
surest way to enhance a sense of security in an age when tech-
nology threatens our anonymity.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: A DIFFERENT
FOURTH AMENDMENT?
The fundamental question addressed in this article is
whether government use of cameras to observe the public activ-
ities of its citizens is a concern of constitutional dimension.
CCTV might implicate several constitutional doctrines, among
them the First Amendment, the right to freedom of movement,
and the general right to privacy. But if one provision has to be
selected as a constitutional basis for regulating this type of sur-
veillance, it should probably be the Fourth Amendment, the
primary source of limitations on police investigative techniques.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
caselaw does not form a solid basis for the conclusion that
CCTV constitutes a "search" or "seizure." Yet, as a linguistic
matter, once camera operators shift from scanning crowds to
targeting individuals, they are certainly engaging in a "search,"
the narrowest definition of which involves looking "into or over
carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover some-
thing." '21 A less literal reading of the Fourth Amendment's
threshold should even more readily lead to the same result.
Whether framed in the Court's language-in terms of expecta-
' See generally, Clancy, supra note 255; see also, McAdams, supra note 139:
[T]he amendment guarantees the people a right to be 'secure,' a word
that means 'free from fear, care, or anxiety: easy in mind .. . having no
doubt.' Manifestly concerned with the repose of the people, the framers of
the Fourth Amendment did not merely create a right of individuals to be
free from unreasonable searches or seizures, but a societal right to be
free from the fear such practices create.
McAdams, supra note 139, at 318-19.
421 WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 1042.
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tions of privacy society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able-or in mine-in terms of a right to anonymity that protects
against unnecessary government scrutiny-that threshold is
crossed when government trains cameras on its citizens, be-
cause of the panoptic atmosphere such surveillance creates (an
atmosphere that the empirical research reported here suggests
is more intrusive than many other government actions that are
clearly governed by the Fourth Amendment). If the federal
constitution cannot be read to place restrictions on CCTV, then
state constitutions, which are less encumbered with negative
precedent, should be so construed.
422
The same approach should be taken toward other large
scale or targeted use of technology by the government, whether
it involves monitoring beepers or email traffic, use of computers
or satellites. Close examination of an individual's affairs, even
those that take place in public venues, ought be regulated to
ensure government intrusion into our lives does not grow with
technological developments. "Dragnet law enforcement practic-
es," to use Knotts' terminology, should be the province of the
Fourth Amendment.42
The usual implication of this kind of conclusion is that the
government must demonstrate probable cause before it can act.
Outside of the special needs/administrative context and frisks,
the Supreme Court has continued to adhere to that relatively
high justificatory standard for searches. 424 Yet that stance ei-
ther effectively forecloses most law enforcement practices using
largescale surveillance or, conversely, provides a huge incentive
to leave them entirely unregulated, the Court's usual choice in
related settings.425 If rules of the type devised in this article
'4 See Burrows, supra note 56, at 1114-1122 (discussing state constitutional
provisions on which regulation of CCTV might be based).
"' Compare Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1084, 1156 (2002)(arguing that courts
should recognize a difference, for Fourth Amendment purposes, between informa-
tion obtained "by speaking with specific individuals versus obtaining it through
the vast stores of records held by companies").
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 88 (2001)(Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)("The traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in our
previous cases on the explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the search
is not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes").
11 See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39
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are to be adopted as a constitutional matter, the "probable
cause forever" standard must be abandoned.4"
Likewise, dependence on the exclusionary rule as the domi-
nant means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment can stultify
meaningful oversight. Never a particularly powerful deterrent
even in the traditional search and seizure setting,4 27 the rule
is even less useful when surveillance of large numbers of peo-
ple, most of whom will never be prosecuted, is the investigative
technique to be regulated. If prevention of violations is the
goal, the "punishment" ought to better fit the "crime."
The proposals made here, which are meant to be general in
nature to allow the democratic process to fill in the details, re-
flect those insights. Neither the placement of cameras nor in-
tense scrutiny of particular individuals would require probable
cause (or a warrant), but politically accountable officials would
have to demonstrate solid grounds for the first action, and
camera operators would have to have articulable suspicion for
the second. Rules governing storage and disclosure of record-
ings, which can come under either the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment's purview, would no longer be secondary to cause
requirements but assume central importance as a means of
protecting privacy. Depending on the rule in question, adminis-
trative sanctions, injunctions and damages should be consid-
ered as a supplement to, or substitute for, exclusion as a means
of assuring compliance, and dissemination of information about
the rules and the use of surveillance ought to be considered as
still another way of vindicating the Fourth Amendment guar-
antee of security from unreasonable searches.
Something akin to these proposals should also be applica-
ble to other types of large-scale technological surveillance con-
ducted by the government. Panopticism comes in many forms.
In this era of rapid technological change, the freedom to be
unnoticed in public, and its associated benefits, will disappear
UCLA L. REV. 1, 77 (1991)("Because the courts have been unwilling to define
probable cause in this adaptable way, the warrant requirement is slowly being
read out of the amendment and many types of searches and seizures are unregu-
lated."). See also, Slobogin, supra note 269, at 1072-73.
412 See Slobogin, supra note 269, at 1081-91.
4' See Slobogin, supra note 407, at 373-84.
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unless a right to public anonymity is recognized and enforced.
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